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ABSTRACT
Jim Tobin, who died on March 11, 2002 at the age of 84, was one of giants of economics of the
second half of the twentieth century and the greatest macroeconomist of his generation. Tobin's
influence on macroeconomic theory is so pervasive - so much part of our professional 'acquis' - that
many younger economists often are not even aware that it is his ideas they are elaborating, testing,
criticising, refuting or re-inventing. In this Appreciation, I consider Tobin's scholarly contributions,
made over a period of more than 50 years.
Tobin received the 1981 Nobel Memorial Prize "for his analysis of financial markets and their
relations to expenditure decisions, employment, production and prices". I consider his contributions
to mean-variance portfolio demand and asset pricing theory, especially the Portfolio Separation
Theorem; pitfalls in financial model building; portfolio balance and flow of funds models and the
'credit channel'; the life-cycle model and social security; econometric methodology, including the
Tobit estimator and his pioneering work using both time series and cross-sectional data to estimate
food demand functions; economic growth; Tobin's q; the 'Tobin Tax'; the monetary and fiscal policy
effectiveness debate, first with Milton Friedman and then with the New Classical Macroeconomics
and Real Business Cycle schools; and Tobin's approach to methodological questions including
microfoundations and aggregation.
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Jim Tobin, who died on March 11, 2002 at the age of 84, was one of giants of 
economics of the second half of the twentieth century and the greatest 
macroeconomist of his generation.
1  Tobin’s influence on macroeconomic theory is so 
pervasive - so much part of our professional ‘acquis’, that many younger economists 
often are not even aware that it is his ideas they are elaborating, testing, criticising, 
refuting or re-inventing.   
Together with Markowitz, Tobin developed the mean-variance approach to 
portfolio choice under uncertainty.  This became the demand-side - the interesting half 
- of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  Tobin was the father of empirical portfolio 
balance and flow-of-funds models.  Together with William Brainard, he added greatly 
to our understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by giving us 
‘Tobin’s  q’.  His work during the 1960s on explicitly including financial 
intermediaries in the monetary transmission mechanism contains fully worked-out 
models of what became known in the 1980s as the ‘bank lending’ or ‘credit channel’ 
of monetary policy.  He made early and important contributions to the neoclassical 
theory of growth with outside money.  He was a leading contributor to the theory and 
empirics of the life-cycle model of consumption, including the role of liquidity 
constraints.  He pioneered the application of what is now referred to as the ‘Yaari-
Blanchard’ version of the life-cycle overlapping generations model to the study of 
important monetary and fiscal policy issues using realistic numerically calibrated 
versions of that model.  He made a seminal contribution to econometric methodology 
with the ‘Tobit’ estimator for a class of limited dependent variable models.  In a 
decades-long debate with Milton Friedman, Tobin convinced most of the profession 
                                                 
1 A somewhat unusual indicator of his achievement as a scholar is the fact that his name is associated 
both with a theory of the determinants of corporate investment, Tobin’s q, and with a proposal for a tax 
on foreign exchange transactions, the Tobin tax, neither of which can, in my view, be counted among 
his three or four most important contributions to economic science.    2
that the demand for money has an economically and statistically significant interest 
rate-responsiveness; that a constant growth rate for some monetary aggregate is 
unlikely to contribute to economic stability and that both monetary and fiscal 
feedback rules can, in principle, help stabilise the real economy.  While he did not 
succeed in providing a fully ‘Lucas-critique-proof’ theory of a long-run non-vertical 
Phillips curve, he was a major contributor to the currently prevailing practical wisdom 
among central bankers and monetary economists, that monetary non-neutralities are 
persistent enough, predictable enough and stable enough to make (rules-bound) 
monetary stabilisation policy both feasible and desirable. 
In this article, I will not attempt to convey a complete picture of this multi-
faceted, remarkable man, or even of the full range of the professional attributes I 
knew first hand - his qualities as a scholar, teacher, mentor, co-author, colleague, 
advisor of Presidents and other policy makers, passionate policy advocate, critic and 
friend.
2  For half a century, Tobin was Yale monetary and macroeconomics – some 
would say, Yale economics.  His influence on his students, colleagues and co-authors 
was deep and pervasive.  Tobin starts his Professional Autobiography with the 
sentence “Rare is the child, I suspect, who wants to grow up to be an economist, or a 
professor ” (Tobin [1986b, p. 113]).  Perhaps; but more rare even is the young student 
of economics taking his first tentative steps as a professional economist who, on 
becoming acquainted with Tobin, in person or through his writings, did not feel better 
about his choice of profession.  
With one exception, the scope of what follows is restricted to Tobin’s 
published scholarly contributions.  The exception is an attempt to combine Tobin’s 
                                                 
2 Tobin wrote more than 500 papers, and it is impossible to provide a comprehensive overview in a 
single review article.  Grossman [1975] is an interesting review of the first of Tobin’s Essays in 
Economics (Tobin [1971]).  Both Grossman [1982] and Lucas [1981b] contain critical reviews of 
Tobin [1980].      3
published writings on social security reform with my distillation of some of Tobin’s 
lecture notes on the subject – one that illustrates well both the intellectual rigour and 
the moral and political engagement of the man.   
 
1. Liquidity Preference, Separation and Asset Pricing 
Tobin received the 1981 Nobel Memorial Prize “for his analysis of financial 
markets and their relations to expenditure decisions, employment, production and 
prices”.  With Harry Markowitz [1952, 1959, 1970] he developed what became the 
foundations of modern portfolio theory
3.  The key ‘separation theorem’ proven by 
Tobin [1958b], is that in a world with one safe asset and a large number of risky 
assets, portfolio choice by any risk-averse portfolio holder can be described as a 
choice between the safe asset and the same portfolio of risky assets.  The ratio of the 
shares in the total portfolio accounted for by any pair of risky assets is the same for all 
risk-averse portfolio holders.  The degree of risk aversion only determines the shares 
in the total portfolio accounted for by the safe asset and by the common portfolio of 
risky assets.  This is an important and beautiful result, which is not done justice by 
Tobin’s own summary: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket” (Tobin [1996b], p. 
12).
4  Indeed, Tobin’s remarkable result is better summarised as ‘regardless of your 
degree of risk aversion and caution, you will only need two baskets for all your eggs’. 
For the mean-variance approach used by Tobin to be consistent with the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility approach to choice under uncertainty, either 
                                                 
3 ‘Modern’ here means the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  I am not referring to Behavioural 
Finance theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky, Shiller, Shleifer, Thaler and many others 
(Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Shiller [1999, 2000], Shleifer [2000] and Barberis and Thaler [2002]). 
4 This phrase represented Tobin’s own attempt, following the announcement of his Nobel award, at 
explaining his contribution to modern portfolio theory in words that might be understood by a 
befuddled journalist.  It’s a bit like summarising all of modern finance theory as.’How many ways can 
you say “there is no such thing as a free lunch”’.   4
utility must be quadratic or the joint distribution of returns must be normal.  Tobin 
was quite unapologetic about these restrictions on the domain of applicability of the 
approach, as is clear from this slightly irritated comment on Borch and Feldstein’s 
[1969] critique on the Tobin [1958b] paper: “It is now more than a decade ago that I 
participated in the modest endeavour of doubling the number of parameters of 
investors’ probability estimates involved in economists’ analyses of asset choice.  This 
extension from one moment to two was never advertised as the complete job or the 
final word,…” (Tobin [1969a]).   
The theoretical work of Markowitz and Tobin in the 1950s on portfolio choice 
stimulated a large number of empirical studies of portfolio selection and asset market 
behaviour.  The three Cowles Foundation Monographs edited by Tobin and Hester 
[1967a, b, and c] give one a good sense of the intellectual excitement of this period.  
Tobin viewed his model of portfolio choice under uncertainty and the 
separation theorem as describing the behaviour of an individual portfolio manager, 
and he was not an unqualified admirer of the use made by Sharpe [1964], Lintner 
[1965] and Mossin [1966] of the mean-variance model.  All three authors used the 
Tobin-Markowitz mean-variance model of portfolio selection as the ‘demand side’ of 
an equilibrium approach to the determination of asset prices.  The separation theorem 
plus the assumption that all financial market participants share a common subjective 
joint distribution of rates of return means that the common portfolio of risky assets 
held by each and every portfolio holder has to be the market portfolio of risky assets.
5   
The resulting capital asset pricing model (CAPM) has since gone from 
strength to strength as theory and as a practical tool used by financial market analysts 
and fund managers.  It is a remarkable example of a theory that emphatically fails 
                                                 
5 The “market portfolio” is a value - weighted index of all risky assets.   5
empirically yet is generally considered to yield important insights.
6  Among the key 
theoretical extensions have been the extension of the CAPM to multi-period portfolio 
selection (e.g. Mossin [1968] and Samuelson [1969]), the joint determination of 
consumption and portfolio selection over time using a CAPM framework (e.g. Merton 
[1969]) and the construction of dynamical general equilibrium models incorporating 
saving, capital formation and the CAPM approach to portfolio selection (e.g. Cox, 
Ingersoll and Ross [1985]).   
The central reason for Tobin’s reservations about the CAPM model was that 
the assumption of homogeneous beliefs effectively turned it into a representative 
agent model (Tobin [1983a]).  Tobin viewed the representative agent assumption, 
popularised in macroeconomics since the 1970s by the New Classical school of Lucas, 
Prescott and Sargent, as a crucial oversimplification (see Lucas [1981, 1990], 
Kydland and Prescott [1982], Prescott [1986b], Stokey and Lucas with Prescott 
[1989] and Sargent [1987]).
7  The massive transaction volumes observed day-by-day 
in the stock market, the government debt markets and most of all in the foreign 
exchange markets are driven mainly by traders taking or unwinding positions based 
on conflicting information and expectations.  The CAPM model, with its 
homogeneous beliefs, has zero trade in equilibrium.  This issue is considered at 
greater length in Section 9.   
 
                                                 
6 The first implication of the CAPM is that all investors will choose to hold the “market portfolio”.  
Since most investors hold very few assets in their portfolios, and different investors hold different risky 
portfolios, the CAPM model falls empirically at the first hurdle.  Other in principle testable 
implications are that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient and that risk premium on 
individual assets will be proportional to the risk premium of the market and the asset’s beta coefficient 
- the ratio of the covariance between the return on the asset and the return on the market portfolio to the 
variance of return on the market.  There is no fundamental difference between explanations of rates of 
return on risky assets based on market beta and those based on consumption beta theories (see Mankiw 
and Shapiro [1986]).  
7 I am not implying that these authors only use the representative agent model.  All three authors have 
used non-optimising models and frequently use the overlapping generations model (e.g. Lucas [1972]).     6
2. Pitfalls in Financial Model Building: Portfolio Balance 
and Flow of Funds Models and the ‘Credit Channel’. 
 
It is at first sight perhaps surprising that in his further theoretical and empirical 
work on portfolio theory in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, Tobin does not make extensive 
use of the mean-variance approach.
8   Tobin’s mistrust of the representative agent 
approach and his relaxed attitude towards micro foundations are consistent with his 
decision to pursue the empirical implementation of complete systems of portfolio 
balance and flow-of-funds models using asset demand specifications that were 
eclectic or ad-hoc as regards the selection of arguments.   
Both in his solo-authored work (e.g. Tobin [1963a, b, 1969b, 1980, 1982a]) 
and in his co-authored work with Brainard (Tobin and Brainard [1963], Brainard and 
Tobin [1968]) and with Backus, Brainard and Smith (Backus, Brainard, Smith and 
Tobin [1980]), asset demand functions are not derived from optimising first principles.  
The arguments in the asset demand functions typically include current income, and 
financial wealth and the rates of return on all assets.  A-priori constraints on the asset 
demand functions typically include ‘homogeneity’, that is, it is (anticipated) real rates 
of return, real income and real financial wealth that affect portfolio behaviour, and the 
‘adding-up constraint’ on the entire system of asset demand functions.  In the 
portfolio balance models or ‘beginning-of-period’ asset market equilibrium models 
favoured by Tobin in the 60s and 70s, the adding-up constraint is the portfolio balance 
constraint or ‘Walras’ Law for stocks’: instantaneous excess demands for asset stocks 
sum to zero - if there are N assets, only N-1 asset demand functions can be specified 
independently.  In the ‘end-of-period’ asset market equilibrium models favoured by 
                                                 
8 In his empirical work with Brainard (Tobin and Brainard [1977]), there is a substantial section on risk 
in the CAPM spirit, and something analogous to ‘beta’ is used in the empirical work (Tobin and 
Brainard [1977, equation 3].  In this, as elsewhere, Tobin was more interested in the way the 
“fundamental” rather than “market” risks are priced).  A later empirical paper with Brainard on the 
internationalisation of portfolios uses a mean-variance framework (Tobin and Brainard [1992]).   7
Tobin after 1975, Walras’ Law applies to the excess demand for all goods, services 
and financial assets the same way it does in traditional general equilibrium theory 
(Tobin [1980, 1982a], Tobin and Braga de Macedo [1980]), Tobin and Buiter [1980]).   
The most natural interpretation of the rates of return that appear as arguments 
in these asset demand functions is that they are expected rates of return and that 
subjective conditional second and higher moments are suppressed.  There is no 
presumption of financial market efficiency, whether in the sense of information 
arbitrage efficiency, fundamental valuation efficiency or Arrow-Debreu full insurance 
efficiency (see Section 8.1).  Relative supplies of outside and inside financial assets 
can, in principle, influence equilibrium prices and returns.    
The empirical implementation of complete systems of portfolio balance and 
flow-of-funds models has been a mixed success at best.  Problems of collinearity 
among asset returns make the accurate estimation of own and cross effects 
problematic.  Attempts to address this problem through the use of subjective priors 
were intriguing but in the end not wholly convincing.   
Tobin’s students and all those who read his work closely have benefited from 
the attention paid by Tobin to the key formal properties that any well-posed general 
equilibrium model (whether ad-hoc, behavioural, satisficing or optimising) must 
satisfy.  Probably the most basic of these is the distinction between equilibrium 
conditions and budget constraints.  The original motivation for the “Pitfalls” paper 
(Brainard and Tobin [1968]) and for Tobin’s “General Equilibrium Approach to 
Monetary Theory” (Tobin [1969b]) had been the observation that empirically 
estimated asset demand functions often implied behaviour for the omitted asset 
demand function (omitted from estimation because of the portfolio balance constraint 
or Walras’ Law) that was frankly incredible.  It was neither the first nor the last time   8
that distinguished economists would fail to verify or make proper use of the most 
basic properties of well-posed general equilibrium models: Walras’ Law and the 
distinction between equilibrium conditions and budget constraints.
9   
The early papers by Tobin and Brainard on financial intermediaries, the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the effectiveness of (quantitative) 
monetary controls (Tobin and Brainard [1963], Brainard [1964], Tobin [1969b, 
Section 8, 1970d]) provided a pretty comprehensive characterisation of what became 
known more than two decades later as the ‘bank lending’ or ‘credit channel’ of 
monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder [1988], [1992], Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
[1993]).  However, unlike e.g Bernanke and Gertler [1989, 1995], these early 
contributions by Tobin and Brainard did not contain the rigorous and elegant 
asymmetric information and agency costs-based micro-foundations of the wedge 
between the cost of internal and external sources of funds to firms/entrepreneurs.
10   
 
3. The Life-Cycle Model and Social Security 
Starting with his doctoral dissertation (Tobin [1947a]), household saving 
behaviour was central to Tobin’s research and policy agenda.  After Friedman [1957] 
and Modigliani (Modigliani and Brumberg [1954], Ando and Modigliani [1963]), 
Tobin comes a close third as regards the significance of his contributions to the life-
cycle/permanent income approach.
1112   Tobin’s dissatisfaction with the Keynesian 
                                                 
9  It cannot be a coincidence that, as far as I have been able to determine, no student of Tobin’s 
subscribes to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, a prominent recent example of the confusion of 
budget constraints and equilibrium conditions (Sims [1994], Woodford [1995], Cochrane [1998] and 
Buiter [2002]). 
10 As part of the graduate macroeconomics course at Yale, Tobin taught the Modigliani-Miller 
approach to the valuation of the firm, the limits to the applicability of M&M insights and the reasons 
for the existence of differential costs associated with alternative sources of funds (internal, debt, equity) 
to enterprises.  Bank loans were not included among the sources of finance in Tobin’s Modigliani-
Miller menu. 
11 Tobin considered Irving Fisher [1930], to be the originator of the life cycle model (Tobin [1967a]).   9
consumption function was prompted in part by the failure of that theory to reconcile 
the cross-sectional and short-term time-series evidence (which showed the average 
propensity to consume declining with the level of income) with the long-run time 
series evidence which showed it to be constant.  The hypothesis that rising financial 
wealth could reconcile the cross-sectional and short-run evidence with the long-run 
evidence, a hypothesis consistent with what later became known as the life cycle 
model, was stated and tested in Tobin [1951].  A number of further investigations of 
the empirical link between household consumption and the capital account followed 
(Tobin [1957] and Watts and Tobin [1960]). 
The second reason Tobin abandoned the Keynesian consumption function was 
that it made little sense to an admirer of Irving Fisher [1930] to approach 
intertemporal choice with a static model.  This consideration also led him to reject 
Duesenberry’s Relative Income Hypothesis (Duesenberry [1949]) as a satisfactory 
approach to intertemporal consumption choice: the relative income hypothesis 
“…ignores the essential intertemporal nature of the consumption-saving choice.  If 
high current consumption is the means to social status today, high future consumption 
is the means to social status tomorrow”. (Tobin [1968d, 1975a p. 78]).
13     
During the sixties, seventies and eighties, Tobin made a number of key 
contributions to the theory and empirics of the life-cycle model, putting it in an Allais-
Samuelson overlapping generations (OLG) setting (Allais [1947], Samuelson [1958]).  
Some of this work was joint with Walt Dolde (Tobin [1967a, 1972c], Tobin and 
Dolde [1971], Dolde and Tobin [1983]).  Tobin’s [1967a] paper is quite remarkable.  
For instance, it treats household births and deaths using the Yaari-Blanchard uncertain 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Tobin [1958c] is an interesting review of Friedman’s book on permanent income (Friedman [1957]). 
13 A life cycle relative income (or relative consumption) hypothesis would not be subject to Tobin’s 
objections to the original static relative income hypothesis.  Even if its predictions for consumer 
behaviour need not be different from that implied by the conventional life-cycle model, its welfare 
implications would be radically different.   10
lifetimes approach (Yaari [1965], Blanchard [1985], Buiter [1988]).  The analysis is 
restricted to the consideration of balanced growth paths, but incorporates a wealth of 
relevant demographic and other characteristics.    One key question it addresses is to 
what extent the life cycle model can, without a bequest motive, account for the kind of 
saving rates we see in the US.  Tobin’s answer was that it can account for most or all 
of it.  The model was ‘closed’ with a neoclassical production function, which 
permitted the real interest rate to be endogenised.  The empirical methodology 
employed is an early example of simulation using calibration.  With only a modicum 
of hyperbole, one could describe Tobin as the methodological Godfather of the RBC 
school and methodology of Kydland and Prescott [1982]!    
The papers with Dolde extend Tobin [1967a] in a number of dimensions.  In 
Dolde and Tobin [1971], channels of potential monetary and fiscal influences on 
consumption behaviour are modelled, including liquidity constraints.  These can take 
the form of a wedge between lending and borrowing rates or of quantitative 
constraints on the ability to borrow.  The model does not allow for differences 
between nominal and real values, so the identification of some of the financial 
transmission channels as monetary policy effects is not secure.  The analysis is again 
restricted to steady states.  Both asset revaluations and liquidity constraints are shown 
to have potentially significant effects on aggregate consumption behaviour.   
Dolde and Tobin [1983], uses a similar OLG model to analyse the 
macroeconomic effects of mandatory retirement saving.  Many relevant features of 
the US tax system and social security retirement system are modelled and calibrated 
quantitatively.  Again only steady states are considered.  These numerical, calibrated 
OLG models can be seen as precursors of the full-fledged 55-period overlapping 
generations models constructed and calibrated numerically by Auerbach and Kotlikoff   11
[1987].  Auerbach and Kotlikoff took the further major step of analysing the 
behaviour of an aggregate growth model with an OLG household consumption 
specification from arbitrary initial conditions, thus permitting the consideration of 
non-steady state behaviour.  Their ‘generational accounts’ approach to summarising 
the direct effects of the budget on intergenerational distribution provides a natural and 
coherent framework for studying the intergenerational fairness issues that were a 
central concern of Tobin.   
Tobin’s view that economics is a toolkit that can and should be used to address 
practical problems is reflected also in his exploration of the implications of the life-
cycle/permanent income approach for the saving and portfolio allocation decisions of 
foundations and similar institutions (e.g. private universities) that manage an 
endowment for the benefit of current and future cohorts of students (Tobin [1974c]).   
As a further illustration of the power of the combination of Tobin-Markowitz 
portfolio analysis and the life-cycle model, between 1971 and 1978, Yale University 
offered the Tuition Postponement Option, or TPO, as an alternative to student loans.  
Tobin was the architect of this important and innovative scheme, which, because of its 
group repayment feature, offered a form of (labour) income insurance not available 
elsewhere.
14  After graduation, students who elected the plan were committed to pay 
off their loans by paying Yale 0.4 percent of their annual income for every $1,000 
borrowed.  The scheme was intended to have higher income graduates supporting 
(subsidising) their low income classmates.  To achieve this, classes pooled their 
collective debts and paid in cohorts.  Under the original scheme, TPO participants 
were required to keep paying until the entire cohort had paid off its debt.   
                                                 
14 It is similar in spirit to the venerable ‘Tantièmes’, a group annuity with the feature that a given 
annuity benefit is shared by the surviving members of the pool.  Here the short-lived end up subsidising 
the long-lived.  Unlike the TPO complainers, those who end up paying the Tantièmes subsidy do not 
complain.   12
Alternatively, they could buy out their individual loans at 150 percent of the loan plus 
interest.  Subsequently, Yale agreed to cancel a cohort’s debt if that cohort still owed 
after 35 years.   
  Unsurprisingly, complaints about the program started when a number of 
high-earning graduates during the eighties and nineties realized that their accumulated 
repayments far exceeded in real terms (and in present discounted value) the amount 
borrowed.  A further complaint was that, until Yale capped the repayment period at 35 
years, there seemed to be no end to the repayment period.  The highest-earning 
graduates ended up subsidizing both those ‘performing’ classmates who earned less 
than them and those classmates who chose to default on their loans.  The subsidisation 
of the honest poor by the honest rich was a key design feature of the scheme.  Only to 
the extent that the realised default rate (about 15 percent) was higher than anticipated, 
did the high earning graduates have just cause for complaint.  It is probably true that 
Tobin and those who implemented the scheme had underestimated the magnitude of 
the adverse selection problem the scheme would face.   
  The labour income insurance feature of Tobin’s TPO scheme is an example 
of the kind of security and well-being enhancements of "ordinary riches" that can be 
designed by applying the insights of Tobin-Markowitz portfolio analysis and the life-
cycle model.  Robert Shiller [2003] has recently extended and expanded these ideas in 
a number of innovative ways.  
Tobin frequently addressed the efficiency and equity issues associated with 
alternative mechanism for providing for income during retirement (see e.g. Tobin 
[1967a, 1976, 1988, 1990a], Tobin and Dolde [1971], Dolde and Tobin [1983], 
Friedman [1976]).  Like all his students, I learned to appreciate the versatility and 
power of the OLG model, which was used intensively in his graduate lectures.  Even   13
the simplest 2-period version provides a natural analytical framework for studying 
retirement saving and social security issues.  Because it allows for at least one key 
demographic form of heterogeneity among consumers, it also represents a natural 
analytical vehicle for combining a Keynesian approach to the macroeconomic 
consequences of deficit financing and alternative social security systems – which 
requires heterogeneous consumers - with the explicit intertemporal optimising 
approach Tobin so admired in Irvin Fisher [1930]. 
Tobin taught me social security issues using the Diamond [1965] model.  This 
superimposes on the one-sector neoclassical growth model the saving behaviour of the 
two-period OLG model.  There is an infinite sequence of generations each of which 
lives for two periods, supplies a fixed amount of labour and pays social security 
contributions when young and lives off retirement savings and social security 
retirement benefits when old.  Starting from a situation without government, with only 
private savings as a source of retirement income, an unfunded or pay-as-you-go, 
social security retirement scheme is introduced in period t.  This taxes the young 
(workers) each period and pays all the receipts of this social security tax out to the old 
(retirees) in that period.
15  For simplicity, assume that each generation pays a constant 
share of its wage income when young in social security taxes – a defined contribution 
scheme.
16  Compared to what would have occurred in the absence of the unfunded 
                                                 
15 These unfunded, pay-as-you-go social security retirement schemes, Tobin referred to as the ‘tax-
transfer view’ of social security.  Mandatory retirement saving, with individual accounts entitling to 
holder to the market rate of return, and converted on retirement into annuities with a market-determined 
return would be the pure version of what Tobin referred to as the ‘insurance view’ of social security. 
16 Let  t N  be the number of young workers in period t, (also the number of old retirees in period  1 t + ).  
Let  t τ  be the per capita contribution of the young workers in period t and  t b  the per capita retirement 
benefit paid out in period t to the old in period t.  An unfunded scheme is, by definition, a balanced-
budget scheme:  1 tt t t NN b τ − = .  Clearly, with  t N  and  1 t N −  given, the contribution rate and the 
benefit rate cannot be specified independently.  The defined contribution (that is, exogenous 
contribution) version of the unfunded social security retirement scheme fixes the contribution rate  t τ  
and treats the benefit rate  t b  as endogenously or residually determined.  The defined benefit (that is,   14
social security retirement scheme, its introduction will reduce the total stock of private 
financial wealth in the economy (the saving of the young).  In a closed economy, it 
will also reduce the capital stock.  It will reduce the flow of private saving (the sum of 
saving by the young and dissaving by the old) if there is positive population growth or 
if there is positive labour productivity growth.
17    
Introducing a pay-as-you-go, unfunded social security retirement scheme (an 
intergenerational redistribution scheme) in period t provides a windfall to the 
generation that is old in generation t.   This generation made no social security 
retirement contributions when young, but nevertheless gets retirement benefits when 
old.  My grandparents were in that position, and they were both pleased and amazed at 
this windfall.  Generations born in period t or later, that will both pay the tax when 
young and receive the benefit when old, will be worse off (better off) with the social 
security retirement scheme than without it if the ‘biological rate of return’ on the 
unfunded social security retirement scheme, the sum of the population growth rate and 
the growth rate of labour productivity, is below (above) the market rate of return on 
saving  
With declining birth rates, increasing life expectancy and, in the industrial 
countries outside the US, disappointing productivity growth, there are strong 
pressures to reduce the scope of unfunded social security retirement schemes or even 
to abolish them, and to replace them by a mixture of mandatory and voluntary fully 
funded retirement saving schemes.  While Tobin was not opposed to a greater role for 
                                                                                                                                            
exogenous benefit) version of the unfunded social security retirement scheme fixes  t b , the retirement 
benefits of the old and makes  t τ , the social security tax on the young endogenous.  
17 Let  t S  be aggregate private saving in period t, 
y
t s  per capita saving by the generation that is young 
in period t,  t N  the size of generation t and  t n  the growth rate of population between periods t and t-1.  
Then 11 1 ()
yy y
tt t t t t t SN ss n N s −− − =− + .  The statement in the text requires  1 0
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(labour-augmenting) productivity growth is positive.    15
funded social security retirement financing, he considered many of the arguments 
advanced in support of increased funding to be flawed and some dishonest. 
First, as a point of logic, it can make no sense to speak of the deficit of or the 
future liability implied by, a pure unfunded social security retirement scheme.  Such 
schemes pay out each period what they get in - no more, no less.  They are balanced-
budget schemes by definition.  It is true that most real-world social security retirement 
schemes specify the contribution rates of the young and the benefit entitlements of the 
old quite independently of each other, without respecting the requirement that they 
should balance period-by-period.  Clearly, if balance must be preserved, either period-
by-period, as in the pure unfunded scheme or, in present value terms, over longer 
periods, and if contributors in period t base their expectations of the ‘replacement 
ratio’ (benefits in period t+1 relative to wages in period t) on the benefits received by 
their parents in period t (relative to wages in period t-1) or on their own contribution 
rates (social security taxes in period t relative to wages in period t), there are bound to 
be surprises.  When birth rates are falling, life expectancies are rising and/or 
productivity growth is disappointing, the expectations of retirees concerning their 
retirement income can only be fulfilled with rising social security contribution rates 
for workers, or constant contribution rates for workers will imply that retirees will 
have lower replacement rates and lower retirement incomes than they expected while 
young: the surprises will be disappointments – the reverse of what occurred with the 
introduction of unfunded social security retirement schemes in the 1930s.   
Tobin always emphasized that unfunded social security is about 
intergenerational distribution.  When there have been unfavourable demographic or 
productivity surprises, restoring balance, whether immediately or over a longer time 
horizon, implies intergenerational conflict (Tobin [1990a]).  Unless social security   16
reform reduces or eliminates other distortions, the reduction in the unfunded 
component and increase in the funded component inevitably mean that some 
generation (or generations) will be worse off, having made contributions while young 
but not getting the benefits they expected while old.  Therefore, the downsizing or 
abolition of an unfunded social security retirements scheme does not represent a 
Pareto-improvement, even if the (risk-adjusted) rate of return on private saving (and 
on the funded mandatory retirement saving schemes) exceeds the biological rate of 
return in every period.   
Proponents of a reduction in the scale and scope of unfunded social security 
retirement schemes stress the positive effect on aggregate financial wealth (and on 
private saving) of a reduction in the scope and scale of unfunded social security.
18  
This only makes sense if stock of financial wealth and (in a closed economy) the 
capital stock is too low, that is, if the saving rate of the young is too low.  However, 
the only violation of dynamic efficiency that can occur in the pure Allais-Samuelson-
Diamond OLG model with lump sum social security contributions and benefits is too 
large a stock of financial wealth of capital.  Saving by the young could be so high that 
it drives the rate of return on capital below the natural rate of growth for ever.  The 
pure unfunded social security retirement scheme effects lump-sum intergenerational 
distribution from the young to the old (which unambiguously reduces saving by the 
young).  It will therefore never aggravate and may alleviate dynamic inefficiency.  
The reduction in saving by the young that it causes is not inefficient.   
                                                 
18 Note that, according to footnote 14, the sign of the effect of such reforms on the stock of private 
financial wealth is unambiguously positive, but the effect on the flow of private saving, while likely to 
be positive, could be negative if the growth rate of population is negative or if productivity growth is 
negative.    17
Unfunded, pay-as-you-go social security retirement is also about 
intergenerational risk sharing or insurance.
19    Through these balanced budget 
intergenerational transfers, forms of intergenerational risk-sharing are possible that 
cannot, in general, be reproduced through private sector risk-sharing facilities.   
Funded schemes permit, if the retirement savings are invested wisely, the 
diversification of financial asset risk.  They do not permit the diversification of wage 
income risk across generations. 
This is of course not the end of the story.  It is not difficult to think of 
generalisations of the simple OLG model used here that could indeed cause saving to 
be ‘too low’.  Endogenous labour supply, including an endogenous age of retirement, 
mean that the social security tax is not lump-sum.  Further distortions are introduced 
by other aspects of the tax – transfer system, such as the taxation (sometimes double 
taxation) of the returns to saving.  Still, from the point of view of efficiency as well as 
of social and generational welfare and justice, the point made by Tobin that the case 
for reducing the scope of pay-as-you – go unfunded social security retirement 
schemes and for moving to a greater role for funding social security retirement 
through a mixture of mandatory and voluntary retirement saving schemes, is not 
straightforward or obvious (see e.g. Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes [1998, 2002] 
for an update on this debate in the US). 
 
4. Econometric Methodology 
During the 1950s, Tobin made two important contributions to econometric 
methodology.  The first of these was his exploration of the combined use of aggregate 
                                                 
19 I am using intergenerational insurance here in a sense that is quite different from what Tobin referred 
to as the ‘insurance view’ of social security, which refers to fully funded, mandatory retirement saving 
(possibly with individual accounts).   18
time series data and cross-sectional family budget survey data to study the demand for 
food (Tobin [1950]).
20  Almost 50 years later, during 1995, 1996 and 1997, this study 
was used in an econometric methodology experiment organised by Magnus and 
Morgan [1999].  Eight teams of contemporary econometricians participated in a “field 
trial experiment” in which each team applied its preferred statistical and econometric 
methods to (up to) three sets of data (Tobin’s original data set, further US data (after 
1950), and similar Dutch data).  The common task for all teams was to estimate the 
income elasticity of food demand, to test the homogeneity postulate of the family food 
demand function and to comment on the differences between their results and Tobin’s.  
Those who know both the original paper and the eight field trial follow-ups will 
concur with Tobin, who attended the Workshop following the experiment, that the 
1950 Tobin “…wrote a pretty good paper” (Tobin [1997, p. 647]). 
The second is a seminal contribution to the estimation and testing of multiple 
regression models with limited dependent variables (Tobin [1958a]).
21  A few years 
earlier, Tobin had written an early application to economic data of the binomial probit 
model (Tobin [1955a]).  This estimator originated in biology, where it is used to 
estimate how the observed probabilities of positive or negative responses to treatment 
vary with observable characteristics of the organism and the treatment.  Tobin’s 
empirical application to automobile purchases brings out one of the limitations of the 
probit model.  Treating car purchases as a binary variable – assigned a value of 1 if 
you buy a car, 0 if you don’t - throws away a lot of information.  The distribution of 
spending on cars is censored or truncated from below at 0, but above zero is more 
                                                 
20 In a joint paper with Houthakker, Tobin used time series and cross-sectional data to estimate demand 
functions for rationed foodstuffs using pre-World War II UK time series data (1920-1938) and two pre-
war household expenditure surveys (Houthakker and Tobin [1952]).  Rationing in the UK lasted until 
1954.  Tobin was on leave at Cambridge during 1949-50, and experienced rationing first-hand.  
Characteristically, this real-world encounter gave rise to a number of theoretical and empirical papers 
on rationing (Tobin [1952b], Tobin and Houthakker [1951] and Houthakker and Tobin [1952]). 
21 Also called the econometric theory of qualitative response models.   19
appropriately treated as continuous.
22  When the dependent variable is censored a key 
assumption of OLS regression is violated: the regression errors are correlated with the 
regressors, and OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent.  Tobin developed what 
became known as the Tobit estimator, a hybrid of probit analysis and ‘ordinary’ 
multiple regression.
23  The field of qualitative response models, limited dependent 
variables, censored data and selection bias has grown explosively and has recently 
produced a couple of Nobel Memorial Prize winners if its own.
24  
 
5. Economic Growth 
Tobin made a number of key contributions to the theory of economic growth.  
His “Dynamic Aggregative Model” (Tobin [1955b]) does not receive the credit it 
deserves as a precursor of the one-sector neoclassical growth model developed in full 
by Swan [1956] and Solow [1956].
25  Not only does Tobin’s model have the key 
features of the one-sector neoclassical growth model (a neoclassical two factor 
production function in capital and labour, smooth capital-labour substitution, 
competitive factor markets), it includes quite a few other features and variants 
(outside fiat money alongside capital in the asset menu, rigid money wages and 
business cycle fluctuations).  It is probably the vast ambition of the paper and its 
                                                 
22 Strictly speaking, if households can sell as well buy cars, the non-negativity constraint applies only 
to the stock of cars held, not to sales or purchases in any given period.  Even the non-negativity 
constraint on the stock of cars applies only to physical quantities, not to ownership claims to cars, if 
there were a market for short selling such claims.    
23 The story of the origin of the name for the Tobit estimator is too good not to repeat here.  During 
World War II, Tobin served in the US Navy.  He makes a brief appearance in Herman Wouk’s novel 
The Caine Mutiny (Wouk [1951]). One of the main characters, Willie Keith, has ambitions to be first in 
his class when entering midshipmen school, but soon sees that this will be denied him: “A mandarin-
like midshipman named Tobit, with a domed forehead, measured quiet speech, and a mind like a 
sponge, was ahead of the field by a spacious percentage”. 
24 James Heckman and Daniel McFadden won the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 2000.  
Heckman’s Heckit estimator echos Tobit (Heckman [1979]). 
25 Joan Robinson [1956] is another economist whose contribution to modern growth theory has been 
undervalued.   20
failure to deliver on every ambition that account for the too limited recognition it has 
received.   
In two further important papers, Tobin [1965a, 1968b] develops a rigorous 
positive and normative approach to economic growth in a monetary economy under 
full employment.  He revisited the issue two decades later in Tobin [1986a].  Money 
is an outside fiat asset, supplied only by the government and with its nominal rate of 
return fixed (say at zero).  The benchmark model (most clearly analysed in Tobin 
[1968b]) has money and capital as perfect substitutes: their pecuniary rates of return 
must be equal in any equilibrium where both are held.  A higher growth rate of the 
nominal money stock increases the steady state rate of inflation one-for-one.  With the 
nominal interest rate on money fixed, this reduces the real rate of return on money 
one-for-one.  Asset market equilibrium requires the rate of return on capital to fall 
pari passu.  The aggregate capital-labour ratio therefore has to rise.  Thus higher 
monetary growth and higher inflation are ‘good for capital formation’.   
The same result can be obtained in the deterministic one-sector neoclassical 
growth model with OLG consumption and portfolio choice (e.g. the Diamond [1965] 
model) with outside fiat money added as a store of value alongside real capital.  If 
outside fiat money (again with an exogenous nominal interest rate) is only held as a 
store of value, its rate of return will have to equal the rate of return on capital in 
equilibria where both money and capital are held.   
These models are vulnerable to the introduction (by the public or the private 
sector) of nominal assets with endogenous positive nominal interest rates (nominal 
bonds), since such claims would dominate money as a store of value.  More 
fundamentally, since ‘money’ is neither a means of payment nor a medium of   21
exchange in these models, the use of the word ‘money’ does a disservice to linguistic 
clarity.  I prefer to refer to the asset in question as ‘pet rocks’ or ‘candy wrappers’.
26   
Sidrauski’s [1967] monetary growth model made real outside fiat money 
balances an argument in the direct utility function.  With the long-run rate of return on 
capital tied down by the exogenous rate of time preference of the representative 
consumer/portfolio holder, different rates of nominal money growth and different 
steady state rates of inflation are not reflected in different steady-state capital labour 
ratios or consumption per capita (they are associated with different steady state ratios 
of money to capital and different steady state utility levels).  The traverse between 
steady states will, however, in general depend on the monetary rule (see Fisher 
[1979]). 
  Together with Solow, von Weizsäcker and Yaari, Tobin made an interesting 
contribution to the neoclassical growth model with fixed factor proportions (Solow et. 
al. [1966]).  The vintage capital approach to modelling augmentable inputs remained a 
favourite of Tobin’s. 
Tobin was a ‘green’ economist long before this became fashionable.  In 
“Economic Growth as an Objective of Government Policy” (Tobin [1964]), Tobin 
questions and qualifies the arguments for ‘growthmanship’ (the advocacy of paths that 
promise more consumption later in return for less earlier), evaluates the non-economic 
arguments for growth, addresses the “Growth in What” question (total consumption 
vs. per capita consumption; the treatment of leisure), the power of government to 
influence growth and how different market failures drive a wedge between the private 
and social rates of return to saving.   
                                                 
26 ‘Pet rocks’ does not capture the divisibility of money very well, but it does signal the other key 
properties of the asset in question.  It is not valuable as a consumption good, capital good or 
intermediate input; it is not used as a means of payment or medium of exchange; its supply and its 
nominal rate of return are exogenous.   22
The study by Nordhaus and Tobin [1973a, b], “Is Growth Obsolete”, is a 
textbook example of how good economics can be used to articulate and quantify 
‘green’ concerns.  The paper addresses three key questions.  The first, “How good are 
the measures of output currently used to evaluate the growth of economic welfare?” is 
answered by Nordhaus and Tobin constructing their own preferred Measure of 
Economic Welfare (MEW).  Starting from GNP, they first reclassify GNP final 
expenditures among consumption, investment and intermediate.  They impute for the 
services of the stock of consumer capital, for leisure and for the product of household 
work and correct for some of the disamenities of urbanisation.  They found that their 
MEW for the American economy did grow over the period under study but more 
slowly than GNP.    
The second key question, “Does the growth process inevitably waste our 
natural resources?” gets a tentative negative answer, although the authors point to 
many failures of the price mechanism to price externalities properly.  The authors also 
make no attempt to address the likelihood and severity of global ecological 
catastrophes.  In response to the third question “How does the rate of population 
growth affect economic welfare?” the authors point out that population growth cannot 
continue forever and take comfort from the slowdown already apparent at the time of 
writing in the US.  One may or may not concur with the authors’ overall conclusion, 
that good, well-managed growth is not obsolete.  There can be no doubt about the 
value of their hard-nosed economic analysis of what had until then been rather soft 
issues.  The combination of soft hearts and hard heads is definitely to be preferred to 
its opposite.  
 
6. Tobin’s q and the Transmission of Monetary Policy   23
“Tobin’s q” (which might, in fairness, be called “Tobin and Brainard’s q”) is 
the ratio of the market valuations of capital assets to their replacement costs, say the 
price of existing houses relative to the cost of building comparable new ones.
27  For 
corporate businesses, the market valuations are made in the securities markets, the 
markets for corporate equity and debt.  Brainard and Tobin [1968] proposed q as a 
superior summary measure or indicator to ‘the’ rate of interest of the role played by 
financial factors in the capital investment decisions of enterprises and households.
28  
Investment would be higher, ceteris paribus, the higher the value of q.  Household 
financial wealth, of which the market value of the corporate sector is an important 
component, would move with q and drive private consumption.  Tobin viewed this as 
a more likely and more reliable transmission mechanism for monetary policy than 
nominal and real interest rates.
29   The idea of a central role for q, which has its 
(acknowledged) origins in Keynes’s General Theory (Keynes [1936]) was further 
elaborated in Tobin and Brainard [1977]).  A rather amusing response to a Post-
Keynesian critique of q-theory (Crotty [1990]) can be found in Tobin and Brainard 
[1990].   
It was soon pointed out, by Hayashi [1982] and others, that Tobin’s q could be 
interpreted as the shadow price of installed capital in an optimising neoclassical 
model of investment subject to internal and strictly convex (e.g. quadratic) costs of 
capital stock adjustment.  If both the production function and the adjustment cost 
function are linear homogeneous in their arguments, the shadow price of installed 
                                                 
27 The concept now known as Tobin’s q was first introduced (and discussed at length) in Brainard and 
Tobin [1968].  In Tobin and Brainard [1990], footnote 1 states, referring to “q-theory” “The idea was 
first published in an earlier Brainard and Tobin paper (1968)”. 
28 To the question “why did you name it ‘q’?”  Tobin’s answer was, “Because ‘p’ was already taken.” 
29 The evidence on the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of private consumption is 
by no means strongly supportive of a positive real interest rate effect on private saving (see e.g. Hall 
[1988], Epstein and Zin [1991],    24
capital (Tobin’s marginal q) is equal to the average value of the installed capital stock 
(Tobin’s average q, that is, Tobin’s q).   
Tobin believed that the relevance of q theory was not dependent on the 
applicability of the neoclassical interpretation.  The neoclassical interpretation is 
interesting, however, because it highlights a number of conditions under which 
Tobin’s q will fail to reflect accurately the incentives for investment.  Consider for 
instance a putty-clay type technology where the energy intensity of production is 
variable ex-ante, but fixed ex-post.  Assume that past investment was undertaken on 
the confident assumption that the price of energy would be low.  An unexpected 
increase in the price of energy would reduce the value of existing capital vintages, 
which embody energy-intensive technology, that is, Tobin’s (average) q would fall.  
Nevertheless, the incentive to invest in new capital equipment embodying less energy-
intensive technologies could be high (Tobin’s marginal q could be high relative to 
Tobin’s average q).
30 
Empirical tests of q theory are subject to an endogeneity problem that goes 
beyond the simultaneity and endogeneity problems encountered when estimating, say, 
a market supply function by regressing quantity on price.  If the market is competitive, 
the price of the an individual firm’s output can be taken as parametric, or exogenous 
to that firm.
31  A supply curve can be viewed as an aggregation of decision rules of 
individual firms, with each individual decision rule expressing the firm’s instrument 
(quantity produced) as a function of something exogenous to the firm (market price).  
In the neoclassical interpretation of q as the shadow price of installed capital, q cannot 
                                                 
30 The discussion of the distinction between marginal and average q in Tobin and Brainard [1977] uses 
the example of an increase in energy costs when technology is represented by a heterogeneous 
(vintage) capital model of the kind proposed in Solow, Tobin, von Weizsäcker and Yaari [1966]. 
31 Even if the market price is parametric to the individual competitive firm, there could be a non-zero 
correlation between the market price and the residual in a regression of quantity supplied on market 
price using individual firm-level data.   25
be taken as parametric or exogenous even for an individual competitive enterprise.  A 
regression of investment on q using individual firm data does not recover a decision 
rule expressing a choice variable of the firm to something parametric or exogenous to 
the firm.  In the neoclassical interpretation, the value of q , the current value co-state 
variable associated with the capital stock state variable, is determined jointly with the 
firm’s investment decision – together they characterise the firm’s optimal investment 
programme.  Even if one does not adopt the neoclassical interpretation of Tobin’s q, 
the market value of the firm will reflect the market’s assessment of the past, current 
and anticipated future decisions of the firm. It therefore cannot therefore be taken as 
parametric to the firm.   
There are other pitfalls in empirical tests of q theory.  The market value of a 
firm represents not only the value of its reproducible assets, but also the value of its 
irreproducible assets, such as land.  There is no problem of principle, since the 
reproduction cost of a piece of land is infinite, so Tobin’s q for land would be zero, as 
it should be.  In practice, however, one seldom has the detailed information required 
to strip out the irreproducible assets from the firm’s balance sheet.  Also, much or 
even most of the market value of an enterprise may be due to intangibles, such as 
‘goodwill’, including the value of the enterprise as a going concern.  It is clear that the 
market value of Microsoft bears little relationship to the market value of its 
reproducible tangible assets.  Conventional tests of Tobin’s q, that involve a 
regression of fixed investment on the market value of the firm deflated by some broad 
price index of investment goods, are unlikely to work well for firms like Microsoft.     26
Despite all these problems and shortcomings, q theory is unlikely to go away, 
as it is consistent with a wide range of approaches to the determinants of business 
investment and can be empirically implemented using generally available data.
32 
 
7. The ‘Tobin Tax’ 
Like Keynes, Tobin was sceptical about the long-run rationality of securities 
markets.  Keynes concluded that the liquidity of these markets is a mixed blessing and 
advocated a substantial transfer tax on transactions in securities “…with a view of 
mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States” 
(Keynes [1936, Ch. 12]).  For similar reasons, Tobin advocated on at least two 
occasions, an international transfer tax on transactions across currencies (Tobin 
[1974a, pp. 88-92, 1978]).   
Tobin’s proposal “to throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively 
efficient international money markets” (Tobin [1978, p. 154]) aimed to restore the 
ability of central banks and governments to pursue monetary and fiscal policies 
appropriate to their internal economic circumstances.  It hoped to achieve this by 
restricting international financial capital mobility and thus to uncouple national 
interest rates to a greater extent.   
Tobin’s first choice (unconstrained by political realities) would have been a 
global common currency, common monetary and fiscal policy, and economic 
integration (Tobin [1978, p. 154-155]).  Failing that, a floating exchange rate with a 
transaction tax on foreign exchange market transactions was the least bad solution.   
Tobin’s position on what the first-best choice would be is clearly an 
internationalist, multilateralist one.  I share his view that, under unrestricted 
                                                 
32 For an early influential empirical implementation to US business fixed investment see Summers 
[1981].   27
international financial capital mobility, a floating exchange rate buys at most a 
severely restricted degree of national monetary and fiscal policy independence.   
However, it is hard to see how a Tobin tax, even if it could be administered 
effectively, would do much to restore or enhance the domain of domestic monetary 
policy autonomy.  Nor is it obvious that it would materially reduce excessive 
exchange rate volatility and/or limit the duration and magnitude of exchange rate 
misalignments.  For the tax to have a marked effect in any of these dimensions, it 
would have to be quite punitive and would put at risk not just easily reversed will-o’-
the wisp foreign exchange transactions, but also socially productive international 
financial intermediation.   
Tobin [1978] also contains the suggestion that the tax proceeds could be paid 
into the IMF or the World Bank, although this was not an integral part of his proposal.  
This suggests a quite different rationale for a transactions tax in the foreign exchange 
markets: even a low tax rate could be an important source of revenues for funding 
economic development on a concessional basis.  As a rule, earmarking or 
hypothecating specific taxes for specific expenditures if there is no user-charge-type 
link between the two, leads to inefficient overall budgeting and should be discouraged.  
Given the dearth of grants and other concessional finance available for economic 
development, it may be possible to defend such a dedicated tax on 
th N  best grounds. 
The global anti-globalisation movement thought for one brief moment that 
they had found an ally in the author of the Tobin tax.  They were soon to be 
disappointed.  Tobin was sceptical of the benefits of international financial integration 
in a world with multiple currencies, but he was a strong supporter of free trade and 
multilateralism.  He favoured government assistance to the losers in the trade 
liberalisation process, but with the support designed to assist the reallocation of   28
resources from dead-end industries towards viable new uses, rather than to subsidize 
the continued use of resources in non-viable industries.  Tobin forcefully repudiated 
the anti-globalisation mantra of the Seattle crowd and distanced himself quite 
emphatically from the enemies of trade liberalisation, globalisation and the open 
society. 
 
8. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Effectiveness 
The role of monetary and fiscal stabilisation policy, that is, the scope for the 
monetary and fiscal instruments to be used effectively to dampen excessive 
fluctuations, set a floor under real economic activity and a ceiling on inflation, was an 
abiding interest of Tobin.  He addressed each of the key issues that must be settled 
before the active use of monetary and fiscal policy for stabilisation purposes can be 
recommended.   
First, a case must be made that the normal operation of an ‘unaided’ modern 
market economy is likely to lead to inefficient, socially costly outcomes.  It is not 
straightforward to come up with a definition of an ‘unaided’ modern market economy 
that would represent an acceptable benchmark with which to contrast an activist 
policy.  What constitutes a passive, ‘hands off’ monetary and budgetary policy 
stance?  Are the Taylor Rule and the McCallum rule passive or activist (Taylor [1993, 
1999], McCallum [1988, 1999])?  Do the automatic fiscal stabilisers represent active 
or passive fiscal policy?  To focus the argument, I define activist stabilisation policy 
to include all contingent rules, that is, all policy behaviour that incorporates feedback 
to the instruments from information about past, present or anticipated future 
behaviour of exogenous, state or endogenous variables.  This includes all feedback 
rules, like the Taylor and McCallum rules and the use of the automatic fiscal   29
stabilisers.  It includes both rules with credible commitment and opportunistic 
behaviour.  For concreteness the no-feedback, passive benchmark policy for monetary 
policy can be thought of as either a constant nominal growth rate for some monetary 
aggregate, or a constant short nominal interest rate or a fixed nominal exchange rate.  
Passive fiscal stabilisation policy can be thought of as a balanced budget rule.
33   
Second, it must be shown that competent, well-informed and well-intentioned 
policy makers, capable of credible commitment, could improve on the passive rules, 
that is, that there is in principle scope for welfare-enhancing monetary and fiscal 
stabilisation policy. 
Third, the case must be made that the actual institutions and policy makers we 
have (or have some hope of creating, electing or appointing) can be trusted, if given 
the means, to design and implement rules and to pursue policies that would enhance 
economic well-being.   
 
8.1. Market Failure 
As regards the identification of important and persistent forms of market 
failure, Tobin believed that there were essential departures from the efficient 
competitive market clearing paradigm in the labour markets and in the financial 
markets.  From his very first published paper (Tobin [1941]) to some of the last he 
wrote (Tobin [1995]), Tobin addressed the issue of the failure of labour markets to 
clear.  He always retained the view that Phillips curves (strictly speaking the Phillips 
curve should be called the Fisher [1926] curve) were non-vertical in the run relevant 
for the design and implementation of stabilisation policy (see e.g. Tobin [1967b, 
                                                 
33 Balancing the budget continuously requires some contingent response of spending and/or tax rates to 
shocks to and fluctuations in tax bases.  It is arguable whether this is active or passive policy.  Tobin 
repeatedly stated his fundamental disagreement with balanced-budget policies or constitutional 
amendments (Tobin [1981, 1982b]).   30
1968a, 1972a and 1973a]).  He was not doctrinaire about whether the exploitable non-
vertical short-run Phillips curve was due to incomplete one-or-more period(s) ahead 
nominal wage or price contracts that (partly) pre-determine the current money wage 
or general price level, or to systematic and persistent forecast errors by suppliers of 
labour or other price setters.  His initial response to the search-theoretic underpinnings 
of the Phillips curve initiated in Phelps et. al. [1970] and in Phelps [1972], was not 
very positive, partly because they were a little too invisible handish for his taste (all 
unemployment is frictional) and partly because the early search models had too many 
counterfactual implications for the behaviour of job separations over the cycle and 
other observables.  Subsequent developments in this literature involving two-sided 
asymmetric information in the labour market have remedied some of these 
weaknesses.  They imply that the invisible hand does not necessarily support Pareto-
efficient equilibria and avoid obviously counterfactual empirical predictions (see e.g. 
Pissarides [2000]). 
In his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association Tobin 
[1972a] sketches a theory of stochastic macroequilibrium that preserves an aggregate 
unemployment-inflation trade-off in the long run: “..random intersectoral shocks keep 
individual labour markets in diverse states of disequilibrium…” but “..the perpetual 
flux of particular markets produces fairly definite aggregate outcomes…” of 
unemployment and wage inflation.  The key non-homogeneity that supports a non 
vertical range (at high unemployment rates) for this long-run Phillips curve is that 
there is a temporary floor on the rate of decline of nominal wages in excess supply 
markets, independent of the amount of excess supply, of the past history of wages and 
prices and of anticipated future price and wage behaviour.  This floor will be present 
in any particular market until a sufficiently high level of unemployment has persisted   31
in that market for several periods.  As long as there are individual markets where this 
floor is a binding constraint, there can be determinate rates of economy-wide wage 
inflation for various levels of aggregate demand (and aggregate unemployment).  The 
floor phenomenon can, within limits, preserve a Phillips curve trade-off.  As 
aggregate demand rises and aggregate unemployment falls, fewer and fewer 
individual markets will be at the floor.  For low enough levels of aggregate 
unemployment, the Phillips curve becomes vertical.  A detailed formal development 
of the model sketched in Tobin’s Presidential Address can be found in Iwai [1981]. 
Tobin characterises the assumption that there is a floor on nominal wage 
changes as “A rather minor modification” to a model in which “actual wage 
increases eventually feed fully into the equilibrium components of future wage 
increases”.
34  I cannot agree with that characterisation, as the floor represents a key 
non-homogeneity, that is, a form of money illusion or inflation illusion, albeit a 
temporary one.  It might be possible to salvage homogeneity formally by postulating 
ad-hoc asymmetric real fixed costs of changing money wages (asymmetric menu 
costs), but Tobin would have regarded that as spurious micro-foundations.  As a 
practical policy issue the existence of a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve does not 
matter much.  For stabilisation purposes, all that is required is that there be a stable 
trade-off for long enough to enable policy to boost or weaken aggregate demand.  
Tobin had a visceral dislike of the term ‘natural rate of unemployment’.  Like 
George Orwell, and unlike Humpty Dumpty, he believed that words matter.
35  Calling 
something the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment implied that any other rate would be 
‘unnatural’.  Normative and positive connotations become tangled up and make for 
                                                 
34 With full pass-through, there is no vertical long-run Phillips curve. 
35 In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty says to Alice, “When I use a 
word...it means what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”  “The question is,” said Alice, 
“whether you can make words mean so many different things.”  “The question is,” said Humpty 
Dumpty, “which is to be master – that's all” (Caroll [1871]).   32
undisciplined discourse and distorted or even dishonest policy advice.  Since many 
economists alternate frequently between technical, academic discourse and policy 
advice and advocacy, it behoves us as a profession to pay greater attention to the fact 
that the words we use professionally have a meaning and life of their own outside the 
narrow confines of scholarly discourse.  Tobin alternated between using terms like 
NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment)
36, or ‘inflation-safe’ rate 
of unemployment.  It was a losing battle.  He continued to use the concept of 
‘involuntary unemployment’ to emphasize the difference between unemployment and 
holidays and vacations.  The Great Depression was not the Long Vacation.  The value 
of the output foregone was not compensated for by the value of the leisure gained, and 
the difference was not just due to labour income taxes.  Coasian bargains are difficult 
to strike in fragmented labour markets with two-sided asymmetric information, in 
which players will interact with each other on only a finite number of occasions, in 
which bargaining is costly, external enforcement of contracts is limited, and 
insufficient trust or reputation exists to support non-cooperative yet efficient 
outcomes.   
As regards financial market incompleteness and inefficiency, a key source of 
incompleteness is the limited extent to which human wealth (future after-tax wage 
income) can be mobilised to support current consumption spending. As a result, with 
labour income between two thirds and three quarters of national income in modern 
industrial economies, most household wealth is highly illiquid.  Liquidity constraints 
should therefore characterise the optimal consumption plan of many households, 
especially those with ‘permanent income preferences’ and a rising age-earnings 
                                                 
36 Bemused undergraduates used to wonder how the late Indian Prime Minister Nehru could possibly 
have given his name to the equilibrium rate of unemployment.   33
profile.
37  Tobin’s work, much of it joint with Walt Dolde, on realistic permanent 
income/life cycle models with liquidity constraints that bind at certain points in the 
life cycle represents an important and methodologically innovative attempt to 
determine the empirical significance of liquidity constraints (Tobin and Dolde [1971, 
1976], Dolde and Tobin [1983]).   
Even in those financial markets that are technically efficient, like the US stock 
market, the foreign exchange markets and the government debt markets, Tobin saw 
frequent departures from efficiency in the less restricted senses of the word.
38  He 
accepted that financial markets possessed what he called ‘information arbitrage 
efficiency’ (Tobin [1984]), that is, that they were informationally efficient in the weak 
and semi-strong sense.  You can not systematically make money trading on the basis 
of generally available public information.  He did not believe that financial markets 
consistently possessed ‘fundamental valuation efficiency’: financial asset prices do 
not necessarily reflect the rational expectations of the future payments to which the 
asset gives title (Modigliani and Cohn [1979], Shiller [1979, 1981, 1999, 2000], and 
Brainard, Shoven and Weiss [1981]).  Key financial markets, including the stock 
market, the long-term debt market and the foreign exchange market are characterised 
both by excess volatility and persistent misalignments, that is, prices deviating 
persistently from fundamental valuations. 
Tobin also contested the notion that the financial markets delivered ‘value for 
money’ in the social sense. “…the services of the system do not come cheap.  An 
immense amount of activity takes place, and considerable resources are devoted to 
                                                 
37 ‘Permanent income preferences’ is shorthand for preferences characterised by a low elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution; consumers with such preferences suffer a considerable welfare loss from 
constraints on their ability to smooth consumption over the life cycle. 
38 A market is technically efficient if it is liquid and competitive, that is, it is possible to buy or sell 
large quantities with very low transaction costs, at little or no notice and without a significant impact on 
the market price.    34
it.” (Tobin [1984, p. 284]).  Tobin referred to this aspect of efficiency as ‘functional 
efficiency’.  Finally, the system of financial markets can be efficient in the technical, 
information arbitrage, fundamental valuation and functional senses without possessing 
what Tobin called Arrow-Debreu full insurance efficiency, that is, without supporting 
Pareto-efficient economy-wide outcomes.
39  The reason is that real world financial 
markets interact with labour and goods markets that are inefficient in every sense of 
the word.  This scepticism about the efficiency of financial markets was no doubt 
among the considerations that led him to advocate a Tobin tax on foreign exchange 
market turnover (see Section 7).  
Establishing that there are significant and persistent occurrences of market 
failure in labour, product and financial markets, does not constitute a case for the 
active use of stabilisation policy.  It must also be established that measures aimed at 
directly targeting the distortions or other factors that cause these market failures are 
not effective or infeasible for technical or political reasons.  The illiquidity of human 
wealth and the poor collateral value of future after-tax wage income are due to two 
factors: asymmetric information and free labour laws.  The first of these factors can be 
mitigated but not eliminated.  The second we are happy to live with – there have been 
no calls for the restoration of slavery and indentured labour, or for the removal of 
restrictions on the ability of workers to post bond.  As regards the failure of labour 
markets to clear, Tobin viewed insufficient or excess demand for goods and services 
as the proximate and prime determinant of inadequate demand for labour.  Demand 
management was therefore the appropriate form of policy intervention. 
Much of the debate about monetary and fiscal policy effectiveness Tobin was 
engaged in concerned the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on aggregate demand.  
                                                 
39 The financial market system possesses what Tobin called ‘full insurance efficiency’ if it enables 
economic agents to insure for themselves deliveries of goods and services in all future contingencies.  
In that case, the system of financial markets is equivalent to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets.    35
It did not concern the important but quite separate question as to whether an increase 
in nominal aggregate demand would be translated into an increase in the general price 
level, an increase in real output or some combination of the two.  In Section 8.2, I 
shall review Tobin’s contribution to the debate on the influence of monetary and fiscal 
policy on aggregate demand.  In Section 8.3 the joint determination of aggregate 
quantities and prices will be considered.  Like virtually all American economists of 




8.2. The Influence of Monetary and Fiscal Policy on Aggregate Demand 
During the forties, fifties and sixties, Tobin wrote a number of important 
theoretical and empirical papers on the interest-sensitivity and stability of the demand 
for money (Tobin [1947b, 1956, 1958b, 1965b], Tobin and Swan [1969]).  These 
papers are part of a long-running scholarly debate between Milton Friedman and 
Tobin  (Friedman [1956, 1959, 1968, 1969, 1971], Friedman and Schwartz [1963]).  
Oversimplifying slightly, Friedman’s position was that fiscal policy was ineffective 
(did not influence aggregate demand) and that monetary policy was effective, even 
powerful, but unreliable and not suitable as an instrument for actively stabilising the 
real economy.   
 
8.2a. Monetary policy rules 
Friedman recognised that monetary policy was a key driver of nominal income 
and that in the short run monetary policy could have strong effects on real output and 
employment.  Indeed the monumental empirical investigations conducted by 
                                                 
40 His contributions to open economy macroeconomics include Tobin and de Macedo [1980], Tobin 
and Brainard [1992] and a number of other publications reprinted in Tobin [1996b, Section IV].   36
Friedman and his collaborators and associates established to their satisfaction if not to 
Tobin’s, that variations in nominal money growth (viewed as exogenous and causal) 
played a dominant role in driving changes in nominal GDP growth and, in the short 
run, also of movements in real GDP growth.  Other potential drivers of nominal and 
real GDP growth, such as fiscal policy, played at most a subordinate role (see e.g. 
Friedman and Schwarz [1963] and Friedman [1956, 1969]).  Friedman therefore 
found himself in the prima facie rather uncomfortable position of arguing both that 
money is uniquely powerful as a determinant of nominal and real income growth in 
the short run and of inflation in the long run, and that it should not be used to try to 
stabilise the real economy.   
Tobin, a sophisticated methodologist of both economics and econometrics, 
was unimpressed by the accumulation of evidence by Friedman, Schwarz an others on 
the timing (leads and lags) of turning points in monetary growth and nominal income 
growth.  His “Post-Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc” paper (Tobin [1970a]) is a classic and 
devastating demonstration of the point that timing does not imply causation – a point 
that is as obvious as it is frequently forgotten.  Using an ultra-Keynesian model 
(interest-insensitive investment, no wealth effect and therefore no Pigou or real 
balance effect on consumption, a fixed price level and a monetary policy rule that 
fixes the interest rate and therefore implies a passive, endogenous money stock) Tobin 
reproduces all the leads and lags at cyclical turning points between money and 
national income that Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz had offered in support of 
their thesis that changes in the supply of money are the principal cause of changes in 
nominal income.  While Tobin’s model is deterministic, more recent stochastic or   37
statistical varieties of the Post-Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy (the confusion of 
correlation, timing and causation) can be exposed using similar arguments.
41   
Friedman resolved the paradox of maintaining both that money was uniquely 
powerful and that it should not be used for stabilisation purposes, by arguing that 
monetary policy is too powerful and unpredictable to be used by fallible and often 
self-serving mortals.  The magnitude and timing of the effects of monetary policy on 
both real and nominal variables are highly uncertain (Friedman’s long and variable 
lags).  Unless monetary policy management was unrealistically competent and 
benevolent, activist attempts to smooth the business cycle might well turn out to be 
destabilising.  As the decades passed, Friedman’s position on the ability of monetary 
policy to have any systematic effect on any moment of the distribution function of 
real output converged with that of the ‘monetary policy ineffectiveness’ views of the 
New Classical macroeconomist, like Lucas, Sargent and Barro (see e.g Friedman 
[1968], Lucas and Rapping [1969], Lucas [1976, 1981b], Sargent and Wallace [1975], 
Barro [1976]).   
  Friedman’s monetary policy prescription was for the simplest non-
contingent rules: a free float for the exchange rate and a constant growth rate for some 
nominal aggregate.  At first, the choice of the appropriate monetary aggregate whose 
growth rate was to be targeted by the monetary authorities using the actual 
instruments of government policy (if the exchange rate floats, either a short nominal 
interest rate or base money
42) may have looked like a minor technical issue.  However, 
in the US, the UK and everywhere monetary targeting was tried, the income velocity 
                                                 
41 Learning is a slow process in our profession and what little is learnt can be forgotten again (and 
again), as is evident from the near-ineradicable practice of attributing a causal interpretation to 
statistical tests of incremental predictive content like the so-called Granger Causality tests (see Granger 
[1980]). 
42 In the US, policy is formulated in terms of the behaviour of commercial banks’ reserves with the 
central bank rather than the monetary base, but the distinction is not substantive.    38
of circulation of the monetary aggregate proposed as an appropriate nominal anchor 
turned out to be both highly variable and unpredictable.  Goodhart’s Law (‘An 
indicator is useful until it becomes a target’) struck with a vengeance (Goodhart [1984, 
p. 96]).  This variant of the Lucas Critique held that any monetary aggregate 
designated a target by the monetary authorities would ipso facto shed previously 
established empirical regularities.  The monetary authorities and the scholars 
favouring monetary targeting were led on a merry chase that went from M1 to M1a, 
M1b, M2, M3 and M4 and may well have been headed for M16 and AK47.   
Ultimately, the prospect of monetary aggregates with two-digit numerical indices 
became too much and monetary targeting died of natural causes.  As the former head 
of the Central Bank of Canada, Governor Gerald Bouey put it, “We did not abandon 
M1, M1 abandoned us.”
43 
A common feature of the velocity of circulation of all monetary aggregates 
since the 1970’s has been their variability and unpredictability.  Far from this being an 
argument against the use of monetary policy for stabilisation policy, this represents a 
case for using the short nominal interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy 
rather than some monetary aggregate.  This of course is what monetary authorities 
have always done, when they were not operating a fixed exchange rate regime.
44  I 
know of no monetary authority that has used a monetary aggregate (even the 
monetary base) as the instrument of policy.  There have been differences in the 
intermediate target(s) pursued with the use of the interest rate instrument.  For a while, 
under Paul Volcker during 1981-82, the Federal Reserve targeted monetary 
aggregates, an experiment that was discontinued after two years.  Today many 
                                                 
43 Canada, House of Commons [1983].  There are other versions of this quote about, including: It was 
Governor Gerald Bouey of Canada at the time who made the famous statement: “In Canada, we did 
not abandon money supply targets, they abandoned us”. BIS Review [1997]. 
44 In practice, even a fixed exchange rate regime will involve the use of the short nominal interest rate 
as a supporting policy instrument.   39
monetary authorities use the interest rate instrument to pursue medium term inflation 
targets while attempting, without too much prejudice to the inflation target, to keep 
real economic activity close to estimated normal or capacity levels.  One can agree, as 
did Tobin, that the transmission of monetary policy was subject to long, variable and 
uncertain lags without concluding from that that the appropriate response is a constant 
target growth rate for some monetary aggregate.  Indeed a constant growth rate for the 
monetary target may well be as destabilising as a constant nominal interest rate (see 
e.g. McCallum [1988, 1999]).
45  
A Taylor-type rule to dampen normal cyclical fluctuations, and a readiness to 
do much more in the event of a catastrophic loss of confidence by financial market 
participants, consumers and businesses provide a reasonable summary of Tobin’s 
practical monetary policy prescriptions.  Friedman’s prescription of a constant growth 
rate for some monetary aggregate is completely out of favour today with both 
economic theorists and monetary policy makers, and has been for at least a couple of 
decades.  Monetary feedback rules are the only game in town.  While its lack of 
support does not constitute proof that Friedman’s prescription is wrong, Tobin must 
have derived some satisfaction from the overwhelming acceptance of the kind of 
activist monetary policy rule he had been advocating for most of his professional life.   
 
8.2b. The effectiveness of fiscal policy for demand management 
The interest elasticity of money demand 
Fiscal policy (or anything else) will be unable to influence the level of 
aggregate demand if the income velocity of circulation of money is constant and the 
                                                 
45 A constant nominal interest rate policy tends to give rise to Wicksellian instability, with the real 
interest rate rising or falling without bound.  The Taylor rule is a simple mechanism for ruling out 
Wicksellian instability in a wide class of models.   40
monetary authorities peg the nominal quantity of money (if the LM curve is vertical).  
It will, of course, affect the composition of aggregate demand between private and 
public consumption and investment (and in an open economy, also net exports) even 
when the level of aggregate demand is unchanged.  
The conclusion from Tobin’s key papers on the interest sensitivity of money 
demand (Tobin [1947b, 1948, 1956, 1958b]), that there was an economically and 
statistically significant interest-responsiveness of money demand were a necessary 
part of Tobin’s argument that there was a distinct role for fiscal policy in stabilisation 
policy.   
His paper on the transactions demand for money using an inventory-theoretic 
approach (Tobin [1956]), contained (and generalised) the now famous square root rule 
for money demand which, unbeknownst to Tobin, had been derived and published 
earlier by Baumol [1952].  Unbeknownst to both Tobin and Baumol, this result had 
been derived and published even earlier by Maurice Allais [1947].  Following the 




The title of the paper that started modern portfolio theory, “Liquidity 
Preference as Behaviour Towards Risk”, (Tobin [1958b]) suggests that Tobin derived 
the portfolio separation theorem as a by-product of an attempt to establish stronger 
analytical foundations for the interest-sensitivity of the demand for money.  It is, 
however, clear that the mean-variance approach to portfolio selection fails as a theory 
of the demand for money in the narrow sense, that is, the transactions medium or cash.  
                                                 
46 This episode illustrates two points.  First, the importance of having a competent graduate student to 
do a literature search.  Second, the problems encountered by economists working outside the United 
States in having the priority of their work acknowledged in the United States, especially if that work 
has been published in a language other than English.  
47 Allais [1947] also contains the first formal exposition of the overlapping generations model, an 
achievement often still credited to Samuelson [1958] by many.    41
Mean-variance theory can explain the division of a portfolio between risk-free and 
risky assets.  It cannot motivate the demand for narrow money, that is, non-interest-
bearing cash, which is rate of return dominated as a store of value, because there are 
other assets (government bills) that have a positive nominal return in each state of 
nature.   
 
Long-run financial ‘crowding out’ 
Having lost the argument about the interest-sensitivity of money demand, 
Friedman shifted the debate about the effectiveness of fiscal policy to different ground 
(Friedman [1970, 1971, 1972], Tobin [1970a, c; 1972b].  The ineffectiveness of fiscal 
policy is no longer due to the instantaneous financial crowding out caused by a 
vertical LM curve, but rests on long-run financial crowding out.  The accumulation of 
public liabilities associated with debt-financed government deficits will ultimately 
drive up interest rates and crowd out interest-sensitive private spending to the point 
that there will be no impact left on aggregate demand from expansionary public 
spending increase or tax cut.
48  This proposition prompted a rash of papers analysing 
the long-run effect of fiscal policy on aggregate demand when the government debt 
stock is endogenised through the government budget constraint (e.g. Christ [1968], 
Blinder and Solow [1973], Friedman [1978], Sargent and Wallace [1981]).  Tobin 
made a number of contributions to this literature and I was priviliged to be a junior 
co-author in a couple of them (Tobin [1979], Tobin and Buiter [1976, 1980]).   
With financial wealth (including private holdings of public debt) an argument 
both in the consumption function and in the money demand function, the effect of 
bond-financed deficits financing is to shift the LM curve up and to the left and the IS 
                                                 
48 With a Keynesian consumption function, the balanced budget multiplier makes the effect of a 
balanced budget increase in public spending expansionary.  Friedman, of course, preferred the 
permanent income theory of consumption.   42
curve up and to the right in nominal interest rate-output space as long as the deficit 
persists.  Full crowding out of the effect of a public spending increase or a tax cut on 
aggregate demand is theoretically possible but not empirically likely, even in steady 
state.   
 
Debt neutrality 
At around this time, Friedman detached from the scholarly fiscal policy 
effectiveness debate.  The next key development was the resurrection of debt 
neutrality or Ricardian equivalence by Robert Barro [1974].  Tobin had written on the 
subject as early as 1952 (Tobin [1952a]).  Section 3.3 ‘The Public Debt as Private 
Wealth’ contains the passage. “The inclusion of the interest-bearing public debt in net 
private balances and in total private wealth raises an interesting question.  How is it 
possible that society merely by the device of incurring a debt to itself can deceive 
itself into believing that it is wealthier?  Do not the additional taxes which are 
necessary to carry the interest charges reduce the value of other components of 
private wealth?  There certainly must be effects in this direction.  Additional taxes on 
the returns from income-producing property reduce, at a given rate of discount, the 
present value of that property.”   
The simplest and strongest version of the debt neutrality proposition holds 
constant the sequences of real public spending on goods and services and of monetary 
issuance and considers the consequences of postponing taxes without changing the 
present discounted value of current and future taxes; the government therefore 
continues to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint.  Taxes are lump sum.   
Tobin argued that postponing taxes by borrowing would only boost 
consumption demand under two sets of conditions.  Either private agents are myopic   43
and do not allow for the higher future taxes implied by the current tax cut, or private 
agents are not myopic, do allow for the fact that the present value of current and 
future taxes is the same, but postponing taxes redistributes (current and/or future) 
resources from consumers with low marginal propensities to spend to consumers with 
higher marginal propensities to spend (see e.g. Tobin and Haliassos [1990]).  There 
may be many reasons in addition to the differences in life expectancy between the 
young and the old and the differences in spending propensities of those currently alive 
and the unborn emphasised by the simple OLG life cycle model why borrowing by 
governments may affect aggregate consumption demand. The government may, for 
instance, be able, by changing the timing of taxes, to do for some (liquidity) 
constrained individuals what they cannot do for themselves.
49       
Clearly, with a forward-looking representative agent model of consumption 
and portfolio allocation (finite or infinite-lived), there will always be debt neutrality 
because one cannot redistribute among identical agents.  The OLG model without 
intergenerational gift motives has the minimum amount of consumer heterogeneity 
required to support the absence of debt neutrality.
50  Barro’s version of the finite 
horizon OLG model with an intergeneration bequest or gift motive supports equilibria 
for which the intergenerational gift motive is operative (the non-negativity constraint 
on bequests is not binding for any generation).  In such equilibria, the infinite 
sequence of finite-lived overlapping generations becomes equivalent to a single 
infinite-lived representative agent.  There will be debt neutrality for small debt 
financed tax cuts.  If the intergenerational gift motive is either absent or non-operative, 
                                                 
49 Note, however, that it remains necessary that there be some heterogeneity among households at a 
point in time for this to work.  If everyone is liquidity-constrained, the government cannot cut taxes and 
borrow, because there will be no-one to purchase the additional public debt.  So, in order to be able to 
redistribute disposable resources for the same consumer at different points in time, it must be possible 
to redistribute among consumers at a point in time. 
50 This is true even if each generation is infinite-lived and if all generations are taxed the same.  All it 
requires is ‘new entrants’, that is, a positive birth rate.  See e.g. Buiter [1988].   44
postponing taxes will (if future taxes either fall equally on young and old or more 
heavily on the young) amount to redistribution from the young to the old or from 
unborn future generations to generations currently alive.  Both kinds of redistribution 
will boost aggregate consumption. 
For the postponement of taxes to boost consumption it is important, as Tobin 
points out in the quotation given above, that the postponed taxes not be taxes on the 
returns from income-producing assets that are owned by households alive at the time 
of the tax reduction.  If the tax is a land tax, say, and if the land market is efficient, a 
tax cut that preserves the present discounted value of current and future taxes will 
leave unchanged the current value of the land and the consumption of its owners.  
Taxes on labour income are the natural example of taxes that do not get capitalised in 
this way, at least not since the abolition of hereditary slavery.   
Not surprisingly, strict Ricardian equivalence is not supported by the data (see 
e.g. Elmendorf and Mankiw [1999]).  Debt financed tax cuts that do not affect the 
market’s assessment of the government’s ability and willingness to satisfy its 
intertemporal budget constraint will boost consumption and aggregate domestic 
demand.   
The debate about the ability of fiscal policy to influence aggregate demand is 
on-going and has dealt with issues that were not a primary concern of Tobin.  For 
instance, even if Ricardian equivalence holds, there remain fiscal policy actions that 
affect aggregate demand.  In the infinite-lived representative consumer model with 
complete markets, a temporary increase in government consumption spending raises 
aggregate demand unless government consumption is a perfect substitute for private 
consumption in the private utility function.  Money-financed tax cuts or spending 
increases will likewise boost aggregate demand in a world with Ricardian equivalence.    45
Stimuli to private investment such as a temporary investment tax credit or a temporary 
investment subsidy affect investment spending through the neoclassical channel of 
altering the intertemporal terms of trade.  So will temporary (and revenue-neutral) 
changes in the pattern of VAT and other indirect tax rates over time, and temporary 
(revenue-neutral) changes in labour income taxes and social security contributions.  
This takes us quite a long way from conventional fiscal stabilisation policy, however. 
 
8.3. Aggregate Demand Meets Aggregate Supply 
Tobin’s view of how aggregate demand interacts with the supply side of the 
economy to produce equilibrium quantities and prices, including asset prices and rates 
of return, varies over time and across different contributions written at roughly the 
same point in time.  Thanks to some of the later, more reflective writings of Tobin 
(especially Tobin [1983b, 1992b, c, 1993, 1995]) I have been able to put together a 
portmanteau schematic that may help bring out the underlying order that I believe is 
there.  
I interpret Tobin’s view of the ways in which demand management policy can 
influence actual employment or output as follows: A denotes real aggregate demand, 
Y  actual output, 
N Y  the natural level of output (that is, the level of output produced 
by the natural level of employment) and 
F Y  the full information level of output.  To 
save on notation,  ,a n d
NF YY Y will, when there is no risk of confusion, also be taken 
to stand for the actual, natural and full information levels of employment.  Full 
information output is the level of output (not necessarily unique or independent of 
aggregate demand) that would prevail if there were no perception and forecast errors.  
The  natural level of output (employment) is that level (probably unique and 
independent of aggregate demand at a point in time, although possibly hysteretic or   46
path-dependent in the long run) at which every worker who wants to work is 
employed at the prevailing wage.
51 
52 Tobin would have preferred to call this full 
employment and the full employment level of output.   l E  is the expectation operator 
conditional on information available at time l.  By definition,  
  () ( )
NF N F YY Y Y YY ≡+ − + −  
For macroeconomic models to exhibit the strong New Classical policy 
ineffectiveness properties (only unanticipated policy matters for real output and 
employment), three features must be present: (A1) 
F N YY = : the natural and full 
information levels of output are the same; (A2) The natural rate is unique and 
independent of aggregate demand; (A3)  [( ) ( ) ] 0 , 0
F
tj EY tYt j − −= ≥ : perception or 
forecast errors don’t have a systematic component.  This last property would be an 
implication of rational expectations. 
The Friedman-Lucas-Rapping “surprise” or “misperceptions” supply function 
(Friedman [1968], Lucas and Rapping [1969]), according to which actual output or 
employment differ from their natural values only if the there are price surprises 
(misperceptions or forecast errors) is an example of (A1) and (A2) holding.   
Formally, however, the Lucas-Rapping model is an intertemporal substitution 
model of labour supply, in which labour supply is driven by the value of the current 
real wage relative to the present discounted value of the future real wage.  In this 
model, the full-information supply of labour and the full information levels of 
employment and output could be affected by anticipated monetary (or fiscal) policy, if 
anticipated monetary (or fiscal) policy were to have an effect on the real interest rate.  
Absence of superneutrality of money can be a feature of monetary general equilibrium 
                                                 
51 Even at a point in time, the natural rate could depend on structural features of the labour and product 
markets, including monopoly and monopsony power, unemployment benefits, income tax rates etc. 
52 It will be unique at a point in time if labour supply and demand are independent of the real and 
nominal rates of interest.   47
models as diverse as Tobin [1965a, 1968b, 1986a], Sidrauski [1967], Lucas [1972] 
and Fischer [1979]).  In this more general version of the misperceptions supply 
function, (A2) does not hold: the full information/natural levels of output and 
employment can be influenced by monetary and fiscal policy.  However, such 
channels of policy effectiveness bear little relation to conventional stabilisation policy.  
The combination of the Friedman-Lucas-Rapping surprise supply function 
with the rational expectations hypothesis (A3), which implies that there are no 
systematic forecast errors, means that policy rules cannot influence the first moment 
(conditional or unconditional) of the distribution of output and employment (Sargent 
and Wallace [1975], Lucas [1976], McCallum [1979]).  Even then, it may be possible 
for deterministic policy feedback rules to influence the conditional and unconditional 
second moment of output and employment (see Turnovsky [1980] and Buiter [1981]). 
Tobin rejected all three key assumptions necessary for the policy 
ineffectiveness proposition, although he considered (A2) not very important for the 
design and implementation of stabilisation policy.  He believed that even with rational 
expectations (that is, with A(3) holding), policy could influence the full information 
levels of employment and output (that is, (A1) need not hold).   
Tobin also believed that the augmentation term in the Phillips curve 
represented more that just expected inflation and preferred to refer to it as ‘core 
inflation’, a concept developed by Otto Eckstein [1981] and Arthur Okun [1981].  
Core inflation represents anything that imparts inertia to the price and wage 
determination process, be it adaptive or other mechanically backward-looking price 
expectation formation, long-term incomplete nominal wage or price contracts, 
backward-looking wage-indexation or anything else.  Formally we can see this as a 
rejection of (A3).     48
Tobin was both amused and bemused that the much-criticised ad-hoc, 
backward-looking, mechanical expectation formation models of the early 1960s (such 
as adaptive expectations) made a comeback in the 1980s and 1990s in the guise of 
adaptive learning rules (see e.g. Bray [1982], Evans [1983], Marcet and Sargent 
[1989], Dawid [1996], Sargent [1993], Marimon [1997] and Evans and Honkapohja 
[2001]).
53   This reincarnation illustrates two points.  First, ideas and theories in 
economics frequently vanish and subsequently re-appear in a form characterised 
invariably by enhanced analytical complexity but only occasionally by additional 
fundamental insight.  Second, as soon as the camel of bounded rationality gets its nose 
in the tent of rational expectations equilibrium economics, behaviour emerges that fits 
Tobin’s Keynesian world view remarkably well.   
Many of the small analytical macroeconomic models analysed by Tobin in his 
papers and lecture notes treat output and employment as demand-determined, with no 
appeal to misperception or forecasting errors (e.g Tobin [1993]).  One way of 
characterising a Keynesian short-run or temporary equilibrium would be 
F N A YY Y == < .
54   Tobin never provided a complete model generating such a 
temporary equilibrium from optimising first principles, but he was sympathetic to the 
co-ordination failure approaches of e.g. Weitzman [1982], Bryant [1983] and Cooper 
and John [1988].  A different Keynesian temporary equilibrium is supported by 
Phillips curve models with sluggish core inflation (in the New Classical interpretation, 
a surprise supply function with non-rational expectations).  The natural interpretation 
                                                 
53 A striking recent example is Selgin [2003].  In a paper on adaptive learning and the transition to fiat 
money, adaptive learning turns out to mean static expectations (the present and future are expected to 
be like yesterday).  In addition, Ellison and Fudenberg [1993] are credited as the source of this static 
expectations ‘rule of thumb’.  It is further evidence of the immaturity of economics as a science that an 
appeal to higher authority (Marx, Keynes, Lucas etc.) is often considered an acceptable substitute for 
empirical evidence or logical argument starting from reasonable primitive assumptions.  
54 To keep the taxonomy tractable, I include in this specification the models that permit aggregate 
demand to differ from real output,  A Y ≠ , treat real output as predetermined, and make the rate of 
change of output a function of the gap between A and Y (see e.g. Tobin [1975b]).   49
of such models is that A Y =  and 
F N YY = , with 
N Y  exogenous, but that (A3) is not 
satisfied: deviations of actual output from the natural level of output are non-random 
and can be influenced by systematic policy rules.  Tobin’s papers with Phillips curves 
and sluggish core inflation fit into this category (e.g. Tobin [1967b, 1968a, 1972a, 
1973a, 1975b], Tobin and Buiter [1980]).  
 
8.4. Can Our Institutions and Policy Makers Deliver Good Stabilisation Policy? 
Tobin’s arguments that (1) monetary and fiscal policy can systematically 
affect aggregate demand and (2) variations in aggregate demand have a systematic 
effect on aggregate output and employment, at least in the short run, do not suffice to 
make the case for active stabilisation policy.  The case remains to be made that our 
political system will elect or appoint policy makers that have the capability and the 
willingness to pursue wellbeing-enhancing stabilisation policy.  Here Tobin was an 
unreconstructed optimist.  His own experience on the Council of Economics Advisers 
during the Kennedy years (1961-62) confirmed his belief – perhaps his faith – that the 
economics profession had developed the tools to stabilise the economy and that policy 
makers could be convinced to use them.  At one level, he recognised that the factors 
that cause market failure (e.g asymmetric information, the inability to make binding 
commitments, transaction costs, non-rivalness in use, non-excludability) are often the 
same factors that cause government failure, including the failure of government 
policies intended to address the market failure.  Nevertheless, he kept coming up with 
plans and proposals to improve the performance of markets and other economic 
institutions.  Despite many disappointments about economic policies and policy 
makers in the forty years after he left the Council, this optimism about man’s ability 
to improve the working of the economy, and the material foundations of the quality of   50
life in general, never left him.  ‘Social engineer’ was not a term of opprobrium to 
Tobin (Tobin [1986b, 1990b]).   
 
9. Methodology: Microfoundations, Aggregation and Deep 
Structural Excavation 
Macroeconomics, the study of the economy as a whole, tries to establish 
relationships between aggregate economic variables, economy-wide prices and policy 
instruments, that are stable (‘invariant’) under the kinds of shocks and interventions 
the macroeconomic modeller is interested in analysing.  Where do (or should) we 
economists find the behavioural hypotheses that shape the models use to understand 
the world around us and to predict the future?  I believe Tobin’s answer to be: 
anywhere insight may be found.  While this answer is not an operational guide, it 
underlines Tobin’s life-long openness to old and new approaches and his non-
dogmatic willingness to let 100 flowers bloom. 
Tobin’s introduction to the first volume of his collected essays (Tobin [1971]) 
hits the nail right on the head:  “Although macroeconomic models do not pay explicit 
attention to the internal composition of the aggregates, the relationships among 
aggregate variables that make up the models are intended to be consistent with 
theoretical and empirical knowledge of the behavior of individual economic units and 
particular markets.”…“Unfortunately it is seldom true that an exact relationship 
among aggregate variables, independent of their composition, can be built up from 
the basis microeconomic relationships.  The usual procedure is simple analogy, but it 
is not clear that this is always the best approximation.  Although there is a theory of 
aggregation, so far it gives little guide to the optimal specification of aggregate   51
variables and relationships.  Fortunately this logical gap does not seem to be of 
decisive practical importance.” (Tobin [1971, pp. viii-ix]).
55   
Note that Tobin refers to the ‘behavior of individual economic units’, not to 
the optimising behaviour of individual economic units.  Tobin was not wedded to the 
notion that constrained optimisation was the only permissible way to generate 
decision rules or other characterisations of individual behaviour, like Euler-
equations.
56  Where he deemed it the best tool for addressing the issue at hand (e.g. 
intertemporal choice in the life-cycle model) Tobin used constrained optimisation 
approaches to household and firm behaviour freely and expertly.  Where constrained 
optimisation yielded no insight at best and at worst did no more than obscure our 
ignorance about the fundamental roots of a phenomenon (e.g. nominal rigidities, the 
demand for money), he directly postulated decision rules with properties that made 
sense based on empirical observation, introspection or a sudden flash of insight.   
For Tobin, individual rational behaviour was not synonymous with optimising 
behaviour.
57  Regardless of the derivation of the individual decision rules, aggregate 
behaviour was most unlikely to look like a (positive) scalar blow-up of individual 
                                                 
55 The contrast with the views of Robert E. Lucas [1980 and 1981, p. 290] on this issue is striking: 
“…it is the hypothesis of competitive equilibrium which permits group behaviour to be predicted from 
knowledge of individual preferences and technology without the addition of any free parameters.”  As 
will be clear from Footnote 60 and the remainder of this Section, I consider this position of Lucas to be 
untenable.  
56 Within the constrained optimisation church, methodological individualism, and the further restriction 
of the individual consumer’s concerns to the space of his own consumption of goods and services, 
constitute further sectarian divisions.  Tobin’s approach was to go for the simplest a-priori plausible set 
if behavioural assumptions that permitted light to be shed on the issue(s) under consideration.   
57 I use the expressions “optimising behaviour” or “individual decision rules derived from constrained 
optimisation” as shorthand for constrained optimisation with unbounded rationality (no limits on 
understanding, comprehension and on computational, data gathering and processing capacity) and 
rational expectations.  Rational expectations here mean Bayesian predictions, where the subjective 
conditional joint distribution function of past, current and future variables of interest is the same as the 
true (objective or frequentist) conditional joint distribution function.  I recognise that the most general 
Arrow-Debreu state-space version of the competitive general equilibrium model dispenses altogether 
with both subjective and frequentist notions of probability; in addition, even when the mathematical 
characterisation of the economy involves either subjective or frequentist notions of probability, von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility does not exhaust the universe of possible characterisations of 
household behaviour under uncertainty.     52
behaviour.  Equilibrium was not restricted to competitive equilibrium.  There were 
many competing equilibrium concepts, and the appropriateness of any given 
equilibrium concept depended on the application under consideration.
58   
As regards individual rationality, Tobin required that rational economic agents 
operating in a market economy with credible contract enforcement satisfy (or, in 
models with incomplete markets and incomplete contracts, plan to satisfy) their 
budget constraints and/or balance sheet constraints.
59   Their decision rules do not 
exhibit money illusion (homogeneity of degree zero of all real quantities and relative 
prices in all nominal prices and nominally denominated endowments).  Additional 
restrictions on individual decision rules (and a fortiori on aggregate behavioural 
relationships) could, but need not, be derived from individual optimising behaviour. 
Aggregate excess demand functions satisfy Walras’ Law and (where 
appropriate) the balance sheet constraint as well as absence of money illusion.   
Beyond that, theory may not help much; constructive and creative ad-hoccery is 
called for.
60   
                                                 
58 The concept of ‘equilibrium’ in economics has become progressively less restrictive and now 
accommodates many states, outcomes or configurations that would in the past have been described as 
disequilibria.  When stationary or steady-state equilibria were augmented with temporary or monetary 
equilibria, equilibrium ceased to have the connotation of ‘state of rest’.  Lucas and Sargent [1978 and 
1981, p. 304], identify an equilibrium model as one which has the property “(a) that markets clear and 
(b) that agents act in their own self-interest”.  With quantity rationing now a familiar feature even of 
models with optimising agents, ‘market clearing’ has become a vague, if not vacuous concept.  
Property (b) of Lucas and Sargent appears to impose two requirements.  First, aggregate behaviour 
must be derived from the explicit aggregation of individual behaviour; second, individual behaviour 
must be derived from constrained optimisation.  Tobin would have accepted neither requirement as 
necessary ingredients of an equilibrium model.  Today ‘equilibrium’ means no more than ‘fixed point 
of some mapping one is comfortable with’. 
59 With incomplete markets/contracts, default and bankruptcy become a possibility if the budget 
constraint is violated ex-post. 
60 The years I was a graduate student at Yale, 1971-75, saw the publication of some important papers 
that demonstrated that the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model was effectively void of empirical 
content; specifically, the market excess demand functions of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium 
model (which are obtained by summing individual excess demands obtained from competitive 
optimising behaviour) satisfy continuity, homogeneity of degree zero (absence of money illusion) and 
Walras’ Law - and that’s about it (Sonnenschein [1973, 1974], Mantel [1974], Debreu [1974]).  I 
became aware of these results through my work as Tobin’s Teaching Assistant in the graduate 
macroeconomics course 1973-4, rather than through any of the formal general equilibrium courses I 
attended.   53
I never got the impression, either from his writings or from conversations, that 
Tobin considered the absence of optimising microfoundations prima facie evidence of 
a second-best or faute de mieux research strategy.  I would go as far as suggesting that 
that Tobin considered optimising microfoundations to be no less ’second-best than a 
number of behavioural alternatives.  The unbounded rationality of the Bayesian 
constrained optimiser (even without fully rational expectations) represents a heroic, 
extreme, indeed unreasonable assumption, justifiable only if it is uniquely useful for 
generating insight and/or interesting testable predictions.  Bounded rationality (like 
‘rational learning’) if not an oxymoron, is close to an empty box.  Economists and 
other behavioural scientists frequently look like the proverbial blind man searching in 
a dark basement for a black cat that isn’t there.  Methodological modesty is called for. 
Tobin’s non-dogmatic approach to economic methodology is reflected in his 
interest in broader behavioural and psychological approaches to economic behaviour 
(Tobin and Dolbear [1963]) and in Katona’s survey-based work on the predictive 
value of consumer intentions and attitudes (Tobin [1959]).  Tobin’s critical interest in 
the evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter [1982] and the transaction cost 
economics of Williamson [1987], and his interest in and support of the work of Shiller 
[1999, 2000] and of behavioural finance in general, also bear this out.
61     
What Tobin objected to strongly is what I shall refer to as ‘spurious’ or 
‘pseudo’ microfoundations, although Tobin did not, as far as I know, use this 
characterisation in writing.  Spurious micro foundations result from the optimisation 
of a poorly motivated objective function subject to a set of a-priori or empirically 
implausible constraints.  The choice of the unfortunate objective function and the 
regrettable constraints is motivated solely by the desire to generate a decision rule 
                                                 
61 Nelson, Winter, Williamson and Shiller all were colleagues of Tobin at Yale.    54
involving observables that fits some restricted set of stylized facts.  Little or no 
attention is paid to the fact that most of the time the pairing of objective function and 
constraints under consideration has further implications that are clearly counterfactual 
(see e.g. Tobin [1983b, 1987, 1992b, c, 1993, 1995, 1996a]).
62   
Tobin’s view on aggregation was pragmatic.  There is no hard or fast rule as to 
whether it is better to derive aggregate behaviour through the aggregation of the 
behaviour of individual units or by postulating relationships directly at the level of the 
aggregates.  Aggregation theory does not help much, as it makes clear that the 
aggregate behaviour obtained through the explicit aggregation of individual 
behaviours can only very rarely be expressed solely as a relationship between the 
aggregates.
63  As a rule, the distribution of the individual quantities matters.   
The key is not to be dogmatic, that is not to insist on a-priori grounds that a 
particular approach is the only acceptable one, regardless of the problem on is 
addressing.  Natural scientists do not study the behaviour of gaseous clouds by 
aggregating the behaviour of the individual molecules that make up the cloud, but 
postulate behaviour at the level of the cloud.  Even those economists that consider 
micro foundations to be a necessary feature of an acceptable macroeconomic 
proposition, the reductionism stops somewhere.  Individual consumer are not (yet) 
modelled as aggregates of individual cells (or selfish genes), molecules, atoms or sub-
atomic particles.  More to the point, household behaviour is not the simple 
aggregation of the behaviour of a small number of individuals.  A mob is not a simple 
                                                 
62 An argument often heard in defence of behavioural rules derived from constrained optimisation 
(including optimising rational expectations models) is that there is only one way to be fully rational 
while there are infinitely many ways of being irrational (or boundedly rational).  This argument is 
vacuous if there are no constraints on what can be included in the objective function and the constraint 
set (including the information set conditioning the rational expectations). 
63 Even when the aggregation of individual behaviours can be expressed as a relation ship between 
aggregate quantities only, the aggregate relationship need not look the same as (be a positive scalar 
multiple of) the individual relationships.  An example is the Yaari-Blanchard OLG model (Blanchard 
[1985], Buiter [1988]).   55
aggregation of yobs.  There are aspects of the behaviour of groups and other 
collectives that cannot be modelled properly by aggregating the behaviour of the 
individuals making up the group. 
At the top of Tobin’s list of unfortunate theoretical developments in 
macroeconomic theory during his lifetime was the representative agent model.   
Macroeconomics, in Tobin’s view, studied how a decentralised market system 
coordinated (and at times failed to coordinate properly) the behaviour of many 
heterogeneous agents.  In representative agent models there is nothing to co-ordinate.  
There is, for instance, never any trade in equilibrium.  He could conceive of few if any 
substantive macroeconomic problem that could be addressed adequately in a 
representative agent setting.  His critique of the CAPM model reflects this unease 
with the representative agent assumption (Tobin [1983a]). 
Many of Tobin’s analytical writings on the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal policy discussed in Section 8 uses some version of the Neoclassical Synthesis 
model, the IS-LM, Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply model, with wage and price 
behaviour driven by a Phillips curve.  A good retrospective on the Neoclassical 
Synthesis (also referred to at the New Economics during the 1960s), with a strong 
orientation on practical policy issues, is contained in the “Introduction” by Solow and 
Tobin [1988] to the volume containing the Kennedy and Reagan Economic Reports 
(Tobin and Weidenbaum [1988]).  The private sector decision rules (consumption 
function, money demand function, other asset demand functions, investment function 
and the relations driving price, wage, employment and output determination) typically 
were not derived from individual optimisation and explicit aggregation.   
Tobin was not at all apologetic about using ad-hoc macroeconomic tools.  He 
agreed with the statement attributed to his friend Bob Solow that “It doesn’t matter   56
that something is ad-hoc, what matters is the hoc it’s at”.  His attitude towards two 
alternative approaches to endow monetary policy with a real, albeit temporary effect 
on output and employment, short term nominal wage and/or price rigidities and 
limited participation models illustrates his pragmatic approach.  Both approaches 
yield a transmission mechanism for monetary policy that makes for short-term 
monetary policy effectiveness, through the negative effect of a one-off increase in the 
level of the nominal money stock on the short nominal (and in general also the real) 
interest rate.  Tobin embraced the approach based on ad-hoc short-term nominal wage 
and/or price rigidities (of the kind proposed by Taylor [1979, 1980], Fischer [1977], 
Calvo [1983], Buiter and Jewitt [1981] and Buiter and Miller [1985]) because it is 
based on a good  ad-hoc assumption: the existence of nominal wage and price 
rigidities appeal to common sense and are supported by an impressive amount of 
empirical evidence, both at the macro and at the micro level (see e.g. Blinder [1991], 
McLaughlin [1994], Bewley [1999] and Nickell and Quintini [2003]).  He did not 
favour the ‘limited participation’ model developed by Lucas [1990], Fuerst [1992] 
and Christiano and Eichenbaum [1992, 1995], because it is based on what he viewed 
as a bad ad-hoc assumption: the existence of convoluted, implausible and counter-
factual constraints on the ability of households (sometimes dichotomised into 
shoppers and workers), firms, monetary authorities and sometimes banks, to interact 
and transact in the financial markets.  Liquidity is a key property of financial markets, 
but arbitrary constraints on the timing of transactions and on who can transact with 
whom are unlikely to capture its essence. 
Tobin was sympathetic but not uncritical towards the efforts of the New 
Keynesian macroeconomists to offer better microeconomic foundations for some of   57
the key ad-hoc Keynesian relationships (see e.g. Mankiw and Romer [1991a, b]).
64  
Tobin often made the point that Keynesian models make no sense unless someone 
actually sets prices and wages.  A competitive equilibrium model in which ‘the 
market’, that is, nobody, sets prices or wages is therefore a non-starter as Keynesian 
microfoundations.  The monopolistic competition model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
[1987] introduced the necessary price and wage setting behaviour in a transparent and 
tractable manner.  Monopolistic competition does not, of course, produce nominal 
wage or price rigidities.  Here the authors appeal to menu costs.  Menu costs are ad-
hoc in two ways.  First, the assumption that there is a fixed real cost associated with 
the change of the price of output (or of labour) in terms of the numéraire is rather 
arbitrary, and probably an example of bad  ad-hoc in the service of spurious 
microfoundations.
65  The same fixed cost argument should apply also to changes in 
financial asset prices, where it would produce seriously counterfactual results. 
Second, the assumption that the numéraire is a non-produced good whose 
quantity can be varied costlessly and at will by the government – outside or base 
money – is ad-hoc, but probably good ad-hoc.  While there is no theory of the 
selection of the numéraire in conventional unbounded rationality economics, it seems 
plausible that, in a boundedly rational world, the means of payment and transactions 
medium would be the obvious candidate for numéraire.  This is made even more 
likely if the medium of exchange/transactions medium comes in a convenient format 
and benefits from legal tender status.   
                                                 
64 He recognised the PR value of attaching the label ‘New’ to one’s product or research program – he 
was, after all, one of the fathers of the ‘New Economics’ - but would have preferred the New 
Keynesians to use the plain Keynesian (or, provocatively, Old Keynesian), label he applied to himself. 
65 Perhaps not surprising in view of Tobin’s work on fixed and variable transaction costs in financial 
markets (Tobin [1956]), he was more tolerant of the fixed menu cost approach of e.g. Caplin and 
Spulber [1987], which implied the rather elegant s-S pricing policy for the individual firm, than of the 
assumption that the cost of changing a price is convex (e.g. quadratic) in the magnitude of the price 
change, which makes no sense at all (see Rotemberg [1982]).   58
Tobin considered it an appealing feature of many New-Keynesian models, that 
by themselves, small menu costs and the nominal rigidities they generate would not 
produce first-order aggregate real effects of monetary policy (and of any other 
policies or events shifting aggregate demand).  Some real rigidity, such as (real) 
efficiency wages (as in Akerlof and Yellen [1985] or Yellen [1984]) or real distortion 
(like monopoly or monopsony power) is required in addition to the nominal rigidity. 
Not surprisingly, Tobin’s view of the real business cycle (RBC) school 
(Kydland and Prescott [1982], Prescott [1986a,b], Plosser [1989], Mankiw [1989], 
Hansen and Prescott [1993]) was negative.  When confronted with the early 
contributions of this school, Tobin could not understand why anyone would consider 
the addition of total factor productivity shocks to the (non-monetary) one-sector 
neoclassical growth model (with saving and investment determined by a 
representative infinite-lived consumer-entrepreneur) to be a promising candidate for 
explaining the business cycle in modern capitalist economies.  More recent 
concessions to a recalcitrant reality have produced modifications to the early RBC 
model that move it some way towards policy relevance.  Monopolistic competition, 
ad-hoc nominal rigidities and ad-hoc mechanisms for ensuring that rate-of-return-
dominated cash is held by rational, optimising agents (e.g. money in the direct utility 
function or cash-in-advance constraints) have made an appearance.  The 
representative agent assumption is beginning to give way to OLG models and other 
tractable ways of introducing minimal irreducible heterogeneity.  With the further 
addition of liquidity constraints for households and wedges between the cost of 
internal and external funds to enterprises (possibly based on optimising behaviour and 
acceptable primitive assumptions, such as asymmetric information and free labour),   59
the New Neoclassical synthesis will be complete.  It is bound to look more like 
Tobin’s world than what the RBC school started out with.
66 
In his macroeconomic policy analyses, Tobin typically postulated a demand 
function for money that made real money balances a function of the real pecuniary 
rates of return on money and at least one alternative asset and of one or more scale 
variables such as real income, real consumption or real financial wealth.  He did not 
consider this approach to be dominated by ‘money in the direct utility function’, 
‘money in the shopping function’, ‘money in the production function’ or ‘cash-in-
advance’ models, all of which provide only spurious microfoundations for money 
demand.
67  Tobin’s writings on the ‘deep’ micro theory of money are non-technical, 
yet full of insight (see e.g. Tobin [1961, 1992a]).  Unfortunately there remains a 
yawning chasm between the deep micro theory of money, which endogenously 
generates the emergence of one or a few stores of value as means of payment and 
medium of exchange (see e.g. the search-theoretic models of Diamond [1984], 
Kiyotaki and Wright [1989], Aiyagari and Wallace [1992], Kehoe, Kiyotaki and 
Wright [1993], or Ostroy and Starr [1990] and Shubik [1990]) and anything that looks 
like a money demand function in a contemporary macromodel. 
  I learnt two key methodological lessons from Tobin.  The first is that micro-
foundations are not synonymous with constrained optimisation - elegant and 
transparent as that methodology may be when used in an appropriate setting.  There 
                                                 
66 Regardless of one’s view of the theoretical merits and a-priori plausibility of the RBC approach, 
there is a serious problem with the method of empirical verification preferred by many of its adherents.  
As implemented in practice, the calibration methodology of the RBC school and its offshoots sets the 
theory far too low a bar to pass.  The standard empirical challenge is to match N sample moments 
(typically sample means, variances and covariances) using models with at least N free parameters.  
Obtaining theoretical conditional or unconditional moments to match these sample moments according 
to some rather vague metric is not a very challenging or illuminating exercise. 
67 The Allais-Baumol-Tobin inventory theoretic demand for money is an ad-hoc cash-in-advance 
model, as it assumes that all consumption purchases must be financed by running down money 
balances – a strict cash-in-advance constraint for consumption.  It endogenises only the decision on 
how much cash to hold on average relative to interest-bearing assets that, ex hypothesi cannot be used 
to purchase consumption goods.    60
are many alternatives – behavioural (including satisficing behaviour), psychological, 
socio-biological, evolutionary and more.  Given the present immature state of our 
subject, the only wise strategy is to be tolerant of heterodoxy.  It is encouraging that 
the 2002 Nobel Memorial Awards in Economics represent an honest admission of the 
uncomfortable truth that even the fundamental behavioural foundations of our subject 
remain an unresolved issue.
68  Second, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for good 
macroeconomics, that aggregate relations be obtained from the explicit aggregation of 
individual micro-behaviour.  This has value only if it produces insights and/or 
empirically testable results about the behaviour of the aggregates that would not have 
been obtained using other methods.  
 
10. Things Left Out 
Any attempt to do convey the depth and width of Tobin’s contribution to 
economic science is bound to do him an injustice.  I am sure there are type I and type 
II errors even in the topics that I have tried to cover in some depth.  In addition, I have 
not attempted to be comprehensive in my coverage of his published work.  All I can 
do here is list a few of the key omissions.  They include Tobin’s papers on 
development economics, written during a sabbatical in Kenya (Tobin [1973b, 1974b]; 
his proposal for a negative income tax (Tobin, Pechman and Mieszkowski [1967]); his 
                                                 
68 The 2002 Nobel memorial award in Economics was shared by Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. 
Smith.  Both laureates are pioneers of ‘experimental economics’, that is, they aim to establish the 
behavioural foundations of economics using controlled experiments.  Experimental economics, while 
no longer in the wilderness, remains somewhat suspect in the eyes of many members of our profession.  
Despite their common experimental orientation, the methodologies developed and applied by 
Kahneman and Smith are very different.  Together with the late Amos Tversky, Kahneman has brought 
insights from psychology into economics and used them to develop explanations of problems and 
paradoxes in cognitive processes, human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty.  “Prospect 
theory” is probably their most famous contribution (Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Tversky and 
Kahneman [1992]).  Smith pioneered the laboratory study of market behaviour and mechanism design.  
Unlike Kahneman, his laboratory experiments involving strategic behaviour in auctions, in other 
complex markets and in non-market economic games, maintained the hypothesis of fully rational, 
optimising economic man (Smith [1991a, b, 2000]).   61
later proposal for a less comprehensive but probably more nearly politically feasible 
version of the negative income tax (Tobin, Brainard, Shoven and Bulow [1982]); his 
interest in intelligent supply-side measures that would reduce the natural rate of 
unemployment (Baily and Tobin [1977]).  Two publications from the 1960s 
(“Improving the Economic Status of the Negro” (Tobin [1965c]) and “Raising the 
Incomes of the Poor” (Tobin [1968c])) helped set the anti-poverty and inequality 
agenda of the Great Society years and the years immediately following.
69   His 
proposals for structural and social policy reform are always suffused with the 
conviction that without sustained low unemployment, the fight against poverty and 
excessive inequality cannot be won.  Tobin the macroeconomist, Tobin the 
microeconomist and Tobin the social reformer did all sing from the same hymn sheet. 
  Finally, a word about Tobin’s Henry Simons lecture “On Limiting the Domain 
of Inequality” (Tobin [1970b]).  It stands out not because of its characteristic clarity of 
style, which one expects to find in Tobin’s writings, but because there is nothing quite 
like it in Tobin’s published work.  It ranges across issues as diverse as the merits of a 
free market in votes, the draft and selective service, the right to bear children (and the 
merits of voucher systems for distributing a limited number of ‘birth rights’), 
education vouchers, the fair and efficient provision of medical care, foodstamps and 
housing.  In this paper Tobin is willing to consider, and provides a lucid analysis of, a 
range of very radical reform proposals.  While he does not engage in overt advocacy 
of any particular proposal, it definitely appears as if, in some of the welfare, health, 
education and social reform areas, Tobin and Milton Friedman may have been less far 
apart than they were on macroeconomic issues.  Indeed, like Tobin, Friedman was an 
                                                 
69 The proposals made by Tobin are, by American standards, radical but not revolutionary.  Indeed the 
first sentence of Tobin [1965c] is: “I start from the presumption that the integration of Negroes into the 
American society and economy can be accomplished within existing political and economic 
institutions”.   
   62
advocate of the negative income tax, an unequivocal supporter of free trade in goods 
and services (Tobin [1991]). and a proponent of a floating exchange rate.  
 
Conclusion 
  The two economists Tobin admired most were John Maynard Keynes and 
Irving Fisher.  This is not surprising, as he combined in himself the best of both.  
Tobin had Fisher’s analytical skills, insistence on clarity and rigour and attention to 
relevant detail.
70  He had Keynes’s talent for identifying the key economic issues of 
the time and for cutting through irrelevant detail to address the core analytical and 
policy issues.  Economics was never an end in itself, but always a means to the end of 
contributing to be better society - a toolkit.  But Tobin respected the toolkit and 
insisted that passion and engagement could never be a substitute for clarity, rigour and 
intellectual honesty.   
Each of the nine or ten aspects of his work discussed in this paper is an 
impressive, masterful contribution to economic science.  The sum of the parts is 
awesome indeed.  But the man was so much more than the sum of these parts.  We 
mourn what we lost when Jim Tobin died, yet we are fortunate to be the heirs to such 
a rich legacy.  
 
                                                 
70 Some critics of Tobin have argued that he did not wield Occam’s razor with sufficient determination 
when it came to presenting his ideas.  Even though I have voiced a muted version of this criticism in 
my discussion of his “Dynamic Aggregative Model”, I believe it to be too harsh.  The ‘when in doubt, 
leave it out’ approach carries risks, and nobody has identified these risks better than Tobin in his 
discussion of Friedman’s A Theory of the Consumption Function (Friedman [1957]).  Tobin’s review 
ends with the (rhetorical) question: “It is certainly better to be simple than complicated.  But is it better 
to be simple than right?” Tobin [1958c, 1975, p. 124] 
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